The formal end of the Minsk Process

With the formal adoption of the OSCE Ministerial decision to close the Minsk Process – not to be confused with the Minsk agreements in the context of Ukraine – and its related structures on 1 September 2025, an almost permanent part of the OSCE agenda since the early 1990s has come to an end. This was the logical consequence of the territorial conquest of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan, and subsequently the highly surprising peace deal brokered by US President Donald Trump between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This agreement was reached at a summit event in the White House on 8 August 2025. At the latest on 1 December 2025, a few days from the moment this piece was written, the related offices will be closed with the formal handover of assets and equipment.

Origin

The Minsk Process is one of the oldest OSCE efforts aimed at helping participating States in solving a violent conflict. The conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh started already in 1988, at the end of the Soviet times, and erupted to a full-blown war in the early 1990s. When the newly independent Soviet Republics joined the CSCE at the end of January 1992, the then CSCE Chair Czechoslovakia sent the very first rapporteur mission to the region. This decision was taken just days after the CSCE had incorporated the former Soviet republics as full participating States; at a time that the violent conflict was still ongoing and travelling to the conflict zone was far from safe. The rapporteur mission visited the region from 12 to 18 February 1992, assisted by the US government with a military aircraft, while Azerbaijan and Russia organized the air transport to the conflict zone itself.

The mission made an eventful and sometimes risky journey to Moscow, Baku, Yerevan, Stepanakert and Agdam and returned to Prague with recommendations for further activities to be undertaken by the CSCE.

The main recommendation was to organize a peace conference in the Belarusian capital Minsk – marking the beginning of what became known as the Minsk Process. The conference never took place, but the process provided a framework for mediation among Armenia and Azerbaijan. That ‘Process’ was run by the Minsk Group, which was also created in 1992, at first co-chaired by the US and Russia, while France joined the team as a co-chair. All three states are influential in the region. France has the third largest Armenian diaspora in the world, after Russia and the US. In 1995, the then OSCE Chair appointed a Polish diplomat, Andrzej Kasprzyk, as the OSCE Personal Representative for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This became a permanent body with offices in Georgia, with Kasprzyk holding the position for all thirty years until the Process was terminated at this very moment. There has seldomly been an OSCE position where so much institutional memory was concentrated.

Military ‘solution’ at the end

Although a ceasefire had been agreed upon in 1994 between the warring parties, violence erupted several times along the line of contact. The most serious clashes occurred in April 2016 when a ‘Four-Day War’ led to a large number of casualties, as well as to the first conquest of a small part of the disputed territory by Azerbaijan. In 2020 the situation escalated into a full-scale war that lasted 44 days from September to November, and which resulted in substantial Azeri conquests of land. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a full-scale attack, which resulted in the total conquest of the enclave. Almost all of its Armenian inhabitants fled to neighbouring Armenia and the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh was dissolved. The outcome was that Azerbaijan once more assumed complete control over the disputed area, accompanied by the near-total disappearance of its ethnic Armenian population.

The total military defeat by the Azeri was succeeded by complicated negotiations between both parties – until the now groundbreaking deal between Nikol Pashinian, Prime Minister of Armenia, and Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, was brokered by US President Donald Trump at the White House in Washington on 8 August 2025. At this trilateral meeting – without any involvement of the Minsk Group – the Armenian Prime Minister and Azeri President signed a Joint Declaration. This Declaration contained a framework agreement with deals on a number of issues which had kept parties apart for many years. The agreement, officially titled the “Agreement On the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan”, became known in particular because of the agreement to establish a land connection across Armenian territory between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan, which is surrounded by Armenia and Iran. This future link got the highly remarkable name of TRIPP: the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity. Another remaining key question – the status of Nagorno-Karabakh – was settled by both sides mutually recognizing each other’s territorial integrity as well as renouncing any present and future territorial claims against each other. The framework agreement did not contain any clauses about the protection of the remaining ethnic Armenians in the conquered enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which subsequently became a major concern of Armenian opposition parties and human rights groups.

One of the provisions of the agreement concerned the closure of the Minsk Process and its related structures. The joint appeal prompted the Ministerial Council to swiftly and formally end the Minsk Process on 1 September 2025. The wrapping up of the process will be administratively completed by 30 November 2025. According to the OSCE spokesperson in an email communication, “assets and equipments are being handed over to other OSCE Executive Structures, sold, or donated, as appropriate”.

What did the Minsk Process achieve?

Over more than thirty years, the OSCE Minsk Process was actively aiming to achieve a settlement of this highly sensitive conflict between the two states in the south Caucasus. However, this remained without visible results. Sometimes this led to criticism that the Minsk Process is just one of the examples of rather ineffective peace efforts by this Eurasian security organization. Future analyses will surely assess the results of this mediation effort, but this is not the moment to quickly formulate strong opinions or definitive judgements. Nonetheless, there is considerable truth in what was often stated in the past, namely that effectiveness of a peace process is not only measured in terms of formal peace deals, but equally (if not more so) in keeping a mediation and negotiation process going. For years, the Minsk Process brought relative stability in the region, despite some serious hiccups. The final end of the conflict came in an extremely violent way, which raises a lot of questions from the perspective of international law on peace and security. But can the Minsk Process truly be blamed for this outcome? Before attempting to answer, it is wise to reflect carefully. In time, history will deliver its judgment.

Lastly, however surprising and groundbreaking the Washington agreement between both leaders was, the difficulties are far from over. The deal was a ‘framework agreement’ and both parties acknowledged explicitly in the Joint Declaration “the need to continue further actions to achieve the signing and ultimate ratification of the Agreement”. Although it constituted an impressive basis for further negotiations and action, the process to achieve a final peace agreement is still highly fragile. It is not excluded that both parties will miss the mediation efforts of the experienced Minsk Group in future moments of heightened tension.

Dr Arie Bloed has been involved in the OSCE almost from the beginning. He was a member of the first CSCE Rapporteur Mission to Nagorno-Karabakh in February 1992.