What German Responsibility Means

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Abstract[1][*]

"Responsibility" has long been a key political concept in German foreign policy since 1949. It reflects the shadow cast by Germany over Europe during the first half of the last century, and therefore implies a determination to pursue, at home and abroad, policies that are diametrically opposed to those pursued by Berlin under Emperor Wilhelm II and Nazi Germany. In today's context, German foreign policy "responsibility" has to deal with the breakdown of the pan-European order of Paris. The article argues that Berlin against this background should assume a leadership role within the OSCE along three major lines: new initiatives to launch co-operative security policies; long-term energy co-operation; and co-operative efforts to enhance the very fragile foundations of governance throughout Eastern Europe.

"Responsibility" is a phrase with a long history in German politics (one only need to remind oneself of Max Weber's famous distinction between "*Gesinnungsethik*" and "*Verantwortungsethik*" (ethics of conviction and responsibility). Since the end of World War Two, the salience of the word *Verantwortung* in foreign policy discourses reflected the material, moral and psychological impact of the catastrophe that National Socialism had brought over Germany and Europe. The notion of „German responsibility" has its roots in a sense of German collective guilt and projected a desire to atone but also to regain political respectability and agency. From the German perspective, "responsibility" therefore also carries connotations of power and influence: to behave responsibly implies doing things differently from the past, and therefore also carries the ambition to shape the future – for the better of Germany, as well as others. The concept thus implies an agenda for collective action in ways that are fundamentally different from the past, rooted firmly in a Western liberal conception of politics, and therefore capable of redressing some of the damage that Germany had wreaked in Europe and worldwide earlier. "Responsibility" thus defines a very broad agenda, to be discharged not only, but importantly by governments through their policies, both within Germany and beyond.

German Foreign Policies of "Responsibility": Background and Meaning

The post-war period came to an end at least a quarter of a century ago; the historical context of German politics has changed profoundly. Yet the dark age of the first half of the 20th century still reverberates in collective memories, and the temptation of authoritarian or totalitarian politics based on ideologies that are fundamentally incompatible with the normative foundations of Western liberalism persists.[2] The concept of German responsibility therefore remains relevant today, and it still demands that Germany makes sure there will never again be a return to the totalitarian politics of brutal annihilation and militaristic expansion.

Yet to whom does Germany owe such responsible behaviour? There are, in declining order of importance, four collectives whose well-being and interests ought to concern German foreign policies. First, governments always have to respond first and foremost to the needs and concerns of those who are their citizens

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1   [*] This article builds on an earlier analysis the author wrote with Kirsten Westphal and Markus Kaim (Kaim, Markus/Maull, Hanns W./Westphal, Kirsten: The Pan-European Order at the Crossroads: Three Principles for a New Beginning, Berlin: SWP 2015 (= SWP Comments 8/March 2015).

2   Cf. Friedman, George: Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, New York: Doubleday 2015.

or live within their borders. A second, somewhat lesser obligation exists towards Germany's European neighbours, due both to the moral implications of the shadow of history and the fact that Germany's material circumstances and fate are interwoven so closely with those societies. The third obligation concerns the Jewish people and the state of Israel; in this case, it is only the shadow of the holocaust and the inextricable ties that created between the German and the Jewish peoples that establish a particular responsibility. Finally, there are the realities of interdependence, but also the normative foundations of Germany's democratic political order, namely the belief in universal human rights, in the inviolable dignity of the individual and its freedom, and in democracy and the rule of law. They imply German responsibilities towards humankind and towards a functioning world order, represented today by the United Nations family of institutions. There are, therefore, three major circles in which German governments can and should demonstrate a willingness to act out Germany's international responsibilities: first, within Germany's own borders; second, in its pan-European neighbourhood that includes the adjacent areas in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean, and therefore also the state of Israel; and finally within the world at large.

Germany's "Grand Strategy": Civilizing European and World Politics

Overall, this adds up to a "Grand Strategy", or – as I prefer to see it – a particular foreign policy role concept for Germany, that of a "civilian power".[3] This role concept implies that Germany should help to establish and uphold a civilized pan-European order. Such an order should comprise both intra- and inter-state politics and institutions, thus bridging the increasingly artificial and unrealistic divide between the domestic and the international arenas of politics. It should also reflect the basic normative convictions that constitutionally characterize Germany and the European Union.

This is an ambitious political project of a transformational nature. In essence, it would involve what Dieter Senghaas,[4] in a normative re-interpretation of the work of Norbert Elias,[5] has called the "civilizing" of politics within the whole of Europe, as well as in the adjacent areas in the East and towards the South. This is – broadly speaking – in fact also the vision spelled out by the CSCE Charter of Paris, the foundational political document for the post-Cold War era in Europe.[6] One excellent way for Germany to meet its European and international foreign policy responsibilities would therefore be to work towards the realization of the Charter of Paris vision with and through the European Union. This would also be entirely compatible with the spirit and the letter of the European Security Strategy of 2003, which outlines the "grand strategy" or "role concept" of the EU as a global actor.[7]

Civilizing politics in this large area would involve, as we have seen, both domestic politics within the states and societies of that area, and international relations. This is a huge and lofty ambition, unlikely to be realized completely any time soon. If at all, it will come about only after many difficulties, with setbacks following advances. Yet it not only makes sense to pursue such a grand strategy through persistent efforts, it seems in fact to be the only viable policy direction, for Germany, for Europe and even for the world as a

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3   Cf. Maull, Hanns W.: Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers, in: Foreign Affairs, 69:5 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 91–106; Kirste, Knut/Maull, Hanns W.: Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie, in: Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 3:2, (1996), pp. 283–312.

4   Senghaas, Dieter: Wohin driftet die Welt? Frankfurt/M.: Edition Suhrkamp 1994.

5   Elias, Norbert: Über den Prozess der Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1976 (2 volumes).

6   See: Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, available at http://www.osce.org/ mc/39516 [accessed Oct. 19, 2015].

7   A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, available at http://www.consilium. europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf [accessed Oct. 19, 2015].

whole. For if efforts to establish civilized, rules-based arrangements of global governance failed, it is hard to see how Germany, how even the European Union could hold its own and defend the core interests of its peoples effectively in international relations shaped by entirely different, non-Western ideologies and powers. Moreover, if world politics fails to promote effectively civilized global governance, the collective self-destruction of our civilization appears as a distinct possibility.[8] For in a world characterized by ever-closer interdependence between societies throughout the planet and the exponential growth of destructive power, collective self-restraint in the exercise of power and the use of force becomes the only way forward.[9]

The Starting Point: A Broken Pan-European Order

The realities in the area made up of Europe and its neighbourhood in the East and the South diverge, of course, significantly from this lofty vision. In fact, the order of Paris largely fell apart as early as 1991, when both the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia violently disintegrated. Wars between ethno-nationalist groups, both within states and across borders, exploded in Croatia, Bosnia and

Kosovo, in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in Georgia. Many of the successor states remained under the control of the old communist elites who resorted to the familiar methods of authoritarian mobilization, manipulation and repression to hang on to power and exploit their societies and economies to the benefit of themselves, their families and their cliques.

The order of Paris was thus severely compromised both from within and through international security practices almost from the start. Since the war in Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of the Crimea at the latest, even the semblance of an underlying political consensus for this pan-European security order has been shattered. Today, there exist again within the OSCE two fundamentally different conceptions of how to order countries, and the relations between them, politically and economically. One conception, promoted by the West, insists on ordering politics within and between societies along the principles of openness, freedom, market economies based on guaranteed property rights, and democracy through rule of law, participation and checks and balances. The other conception, advanced by Russia, insists on sovereignty, the unchecked supremacy of the state from both internal and external constraints, and exclusive spheres of economic and political influence for major powers – which by definition condemns lesser states to a status of (at best) semi-independence.

The Framework: The OSCE

Yet despite all those setbacks the OSCE still represents a good starting point for German foreign policy if it wants to live up to its pan-European responsibilities. For the Charter of Paris formally has never been repudiated by any member state. It thus represents a body of principles, norms, rules and procedures that can continue to serve as a reference in any effort to pursue the ambition of civilizing politics in the wider OSCE area. Second, the Charta of Paris and the CSCE/OSCE process as a whole address the full spectrum of politics, from the local to the interstate level. While evidently not global in reach, the OSCE, with its 57 member-states, with its coverage of large swathes of Eurasia and America and its status as a regional organization under Chapter viii of the Charter of the United Nations, certainly comes close in its internal complexity and substantive range to the global framework of the UN. Third, the OSCE still exists and functions as a multilateral

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8   For the discussion of one plausible scenario for this see: Bostrom, Nick: Superintelligence, Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press 2014.

9   See Deudney, Daniel H.: Bounding Power, Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006.

institution, and as such provides a whole range of tools and institutional mechanisms available to multilateral diplomacy. Moreover, Germany will hold the OSCE chair in 2016, which gives it responsibilities but also offers opportunities.

For all those reasons, the OSCE seems a useful framework for the project of

civilizing the wider OSCE area (that is, the area covered by its present 57 member states, plus adjacent areas in the Eastern.

Lessons in the Past? The CSCE Process as Analogy

A good starting point for answering those questions might be Europe's past. As we noted above, the breakdown of the pan-European security order of Paris since the war in Georgia in 2008 has thrown the area back into a situation in which two radically divergent concepts of political order conflict and compete with each other. In that sense, it resembles the situation of the Cold War, and specifically of the early 1960s in Europe. At that time, the risks of confrontation had become obvious and the awareness of security interdependence began to deepen among all concerned. Then, as now, the competing concepts of political order comprised the socio-economic, political and security dimensions. Then, as now, there were – on both sides of the ideological divide about political order – governments that acted as protagonists (or "Great Powers") to promote and expand their ideological vision of how to order societies beyond their own borders.[10] Those underlying conflicts about political order are, again, potentially heightened and exacerbated by distortions in mutual perceptions and emotions such as distrust and fear, activating the escalatory mechanics of the security dilemma. Then, as now, there therefore exist risks of military escalation and war, be it intended or unintended.

There are, however, also important differences between the Cold War and the present situation in Europe. First, levels of economic interdependence between national economies today are much more elevated than then (though they have declined recently). Second, political systems generally seem to be in rather worse shape than they were then, under the auspicious circumstances of post-war reconstruction and recovery, favourable demographics, and high economic growth rates. The concept of "fragile statehood"[11] therefore applies not only to states in areas adjacent to the European Union, but also to the European Union, in which there exist today states that are weak and governments that are problematic from our perspective of civilized governance. Nor should we feel assured that regression from more to less civilized forms of governance are impossible in what we call consolidated democracies: to sustain civilized governance remains a perennial challenge. Yet weaknesses of governance today are clearly much more pronounced within areas adjacent to Europe's East and South. This gives the ideological challenges from President Putin's version of Russian authoritarianism regimes or from Islamic fundamentalists a defensive quality, regardless of all the aggressive rhetoric and brutal actions undertaken by exponents of those ideologies: Western norms and values are perceived as fundamentally threatening to the alternative concepts of political order envisaged by their protagonists. They are therefore also seen, rightly, as corrosive to the control of those regimes over their own societies, and hence their ability to exploit them for their own purposes. The conflict between the West and its opponents in wider Europe thus has an inescapable domestic dimension that is anchored in the weaknesses

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10 Note, though, that Russia this time does not propagate its own model explicitly and on an inclusive, universal base but only implicitly and selectively for the Eurasian Union.

11 See Steward, Patrick: Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security, Oxford et al.: Oxford up 2011, esp. Chapter 1.

of governance in general and the fragile foundations of political control in non-democratic political systems, in particular. For the opponents of democracy, organized violence is the instrument of choice to pursue their objectives, both at home (through indoctrination and the security apparatus) and abroad (through the projection of force with conventional and asymmetric means).

Despite those significant differences between the old and the new ideological, power and security conflicts in Europe, there may be lessons to be learnt in looking back at the efforts to construct a new, less dangerous pan-European security order during the 1960s and 1970s. Then, as now, governments in wider Europe confronted the need to develop a more sustainable variant to the old order (of Yalta and of Paris, respectively) if they wanted to defuse the massive security risks posed by the absence of such an order. Then, as now, they will have to do so against a background of fundamental ideological and political differences.

The CSCE/OSCE process historically has been concerned above all with the risks of unintended war: its underlying assumption was that all governments in Europe perceived European security as indivisible and interdependent and thus recognized a European security dilemma. This meant that unilateral efforts to improve national security were bound to fail, because any individual improvement of national security risked being perceived as threatening by others. They would take action to enhance their own security, and the overall result would be less security for everyone.

In practice, security interdependence in Europe may have been more or less intense between specific pairs or groups of states, and some unilateral measures to promote national security may have been less pernicious than others. Yet there can be no doubt that there has been a significant degree of security interdependence in the CSCE/OSCE area at the latest since the arrival of nuclear weapons on a significant scale during the 1950s. A major war involving weapons of mass destruction would not only endanger the physical survival of the states directly involved, but of others, as well. This would probably also be true even if such a war did not involve the use of WMD.

The response of the CSCE to security interdependence during the Cold War was three-fold. First, it developed a whole range of co-operative security policies, such as confidence building and arms control measures. Second, it tried to reduce the underlying political conflicts. Third, it deepened mutual economic and cultural exchanges with a view to promote win-win situations and strengthen the stakes in co-operation. The first response required not only a shared perception of a specific form of security interdependence, but also the political will to defuse the risks of unintended escalation. Efforts to reduce the underlying political incompatibilities of interests built on the assumption that both sides in the East-West conflict would be willing to moderate their demands and accept compromise, rather than to pursue victory. Measures to enhance economic co-operation and scientific/cultural exchanges relied on the acceptance of deepened interdependence by all parties.

The CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 represented the first comprehensive effort to establish a pan-European order on this basis. It built on a grand bargain between the two superpowers and their respective blocks in which the West accepted the inviolability of the territorial status quo in Europe while the East recognized the possibility of a consensual revision of this status quo. But it also was a quintessentially European security architecture, reflecting, in the astute phrase of Vojtech Mastny, the "expansive" European conception of security, which saw security as a "long-term, open-ended process with uncertain results", while the American

conception, focused narrowly on arms control and expecting quick results, was "constrictive".[12] The European member states of the two collective defence organizations led by the two Superpowers had seen the CSCE process as a strategic opportunity to lessen their security dependence on their respective superpower, and they had found strong support by the neutral and non-aligned states.[13] All signatories, including the latter, benefitted from the (temporary) reduction of tensions in Europe because of détente, as well as from the intensification of economic and cultural exchanges. The bargain also included an understanding that the ideological conflict would continue but be confined to peaceful argument and persuasion; the document committed all signatories to renounce the threat or use of force in the pursuit of their national objectives.[14] Finally, the East accepted "Basket Three" – the inclusion in the Helsinki document of extensive references to principles and standards of human rights protection – in the erroneous belief that this would not present a serious challenge to the control of communist regimes over their own societies.

This conceptualization of European security along three dimensions (security; economic co-operation; and the "human dimension") may still be useful today, as the following sections will argue:

"Basket I": The Present Security Predicament and Ways Forward

During the Cold War, the security predicament in Europe arose out of the urge on both sides to instrumentalize military power for purposes of deterrence and, in the East, regime maintenance and imperial control. Those policies produced systemic risks to European security. Although the Soviet empire has collapsed, other elements of the predicament continue to linger. Russian claims to an exclusive sphere of interest in at least parts of the former Soviet Union pose a threat, by conventional military means or, perhaps more likely, by subversion and asymmetric warfare, to the autonomy of its neighbours. Bad governance, the brittle control of regimes over their own territory and people and the porous nature of borders between states offer opportunities for subversion and also create new security risks of their own, e.g. by organized crime. On balance, while some of the most serious traditional risks to European security may no longer exist or at least be extremely unlikely, others continue to be relevant, while the European security predicament has also acquired additional dimensions.

A new Pan-European security order therefore needs to integrate elements of collective defence with cooperative and, if possible, collective security. Establishing functioning systems of collective security is politically extremely demanding; individual and collective defence arrangements will therefore be necessary for the foreseeable future. As during the Cold War, NATO will therefore remain relevant as a vehicle of collective defence and hence as a source of security for its member states. But it will also be insufficient, for two reasons. The first concerns the unintended consequences of military security policies, the second the comprehensive nature of Europe's security predicament, which today includes not only threats such as climate change or pandemics, but also asymmetric warfare and subversion. Yet the focus of collective defence essentially is the protection of territory against traditional military threats.

Collective defence therefore will need to be complemented by co-operative security policies. It will no

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12   Mastny, Vojtech: The Legacy of the Cold War for International Security, A Historical Overview, in: idem/Zhu Liqun (eds): The Legacy of the Cold War, Perspectives on Security, Cooperation and Conflict, Lanham, ml: Lexington 2014, pp. 11–55 (25f).

13   Ibid.

14   See Helsinki Final Act, Questions Relating to the Security of Europe, 1a) ii: "…the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating State". Available at http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true [accessed Oct. 20, 2015].

doubt be challenging to identify, design and implement the appropriate mix between cooperative security policies and collective defence so as to avoid imbalances between the different components of the security architecture. Too much emphasis on cooperative security policies risks neglecting precautions to deter expansionism and adventurism, too much emphasis on collective defence risks encouraging misperceptions, fear and the action-reaction spirals of escalation inherent in the security dilemma. During the Cold War, the CSCE process became a veritable "laboratory for conceptual and procedural innovation"[15] and experimentation with co-operative security policies. The tools and practices developed then need to be revisited, evaluated and adapted to the new circumstances, as there is probably much to find there that might be useful today. But the most difficult steps towards such a process may well be its initiation: the profound distrust between Russia and the West, and the resort to deception and faits accomplis by the Russian leadership make it very difficult to enter into meaningful discussions and negotiations. One possible way forward might be the concept of "Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction" (grit) developed by Charles Egerton Osgood in the early 1960s. It postulates the use of carefully calibrated unilateral concessions to communicate a willingness to move towards cooperative policies. Positive responses will be answered by more substantial moves; in the absence of reciprocity, the strategy will continue to make further occasional offers to signal a willingness to initiate cooperation but also make clear that those offers do not reflect a lack of resolve.[16]

"Basket ii": Economic Co-Operation – the Promise of Energy

Economic cooperation offers the most tangible way for all parties to benefit. It also promotes vested interests in peace and thus improves the odds against war and disruption. Energy traditionally represented the backbone of East-West economic relations in Europe. Western and Central Europe depended on imports of oil and natural gas for much of their energy supplies, while the former Soviet Union possessed huge reserves of both and therefore could meet this demand with exports shipped to their destinations. There thus developed a European pipeline grid that connected producers with consumers. All parties involved in this energy trade benefitted: the Soviet Union from export earnings (in hard currency) and prices that generally were higher than the costs incurred by the producers; the importing countries from stable supplies at competitive prices; and the transit countries from the cheap supplies and fees they received for their services.

The energy trade between East and West was conducted largely through long-term contracts between Soviet (later Russian) producers and big Western European utilities. In recent years, however, both sides tried to revise the foundations for energy cooperation in Europe: Gazprom and other Russian energy companies moved to strengthen their presence in the distribution of oil and gas to enhance their market power, while the European Union pushed for deregulation and competition in energy markets, thus strengthening the bargaining power of consumers. The result was a fragmentation of East-West energy exchanges that undermined mutual trust and affected the willingness to invest in this trade. In the end, that erosion of energy cooperation worked to the detriment of all sides: investments slowed, commercial opportunities were missed, and volatility increased. Just as in the case of the breakdown of the old, co-operative security order of Paris, all sides lost out.

It will of course be impossible to reintegrate European energy co-operation on the old basis. However, it would be desirable to explore new ways to rebuild this co-operation and thus strengthen energy interdependence

15   Mastny, op.cit., p. 26.

16   Osgood, Charles E.: An Alternative to War and Surrender, Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1962.

in the wider Europe. Russia's oil and gas will have an important role to play as bridging resources even as Europe moves towards a new energy system based on renewable energy. The same also goes for supplies of oil and gas from Central Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. Enhancing energy interdependence between suppliers, transit countries and consumers will in principle be the most efficient way to organize European energy, if this interdependence would be managed co-operatively. As in the case of security interdependence, this would have to involve precautionary arrangements to hedge against the risks of intended or unintended disruptions of interdependence. Solutions would not be difficult to find for this, however, if all parties were willing not to instrumentalize energy co-operation for political purposes.

"Basket iii": Human Security, Human Rights and "Good Governance"

If the normative acquis of the CSCE process during the 1960s and 1970s consisted in establishing the centrality of individual human rights as a legitimate issue for relations between governments, rather than as part of the protected sphere of national sovereignty, the new pan-European order will have to focus on the agenda of "good governance". "Good governance" is about states providing individuals with a supportive framework for realizing their human potential. The provision of "human security" is one basic prerequisite for this; another is the effective protection of human rights. Beyond that, good governance requires governments to provide for a national and international environment in which their citizens can hope and realistically strive to fulfill their ambitions and live their lives in dignity. "Bad governance", in the Ukraine, but also in Russia, lies at the root of the Ukraine crisis and the destruction of the old pan-European order of Paris; and bad governance also represents a critical security risk for the whole of Europe. For if governments fail to deliver at least some of what their citizens expect from them, they will revolt or emigrate. Moreover, such failure will also have implications for other states, whether intended or not, and negatively affect their collective problem solving capacity: the implementation of collective decisions will have to rely on the bureaucratic machinery of the states that are parties to the decision. If one or several of them fail or lag behind, this will affect the overall results.

Governance is, of course, a highly sensitive issue: it touches upon central aspects of government legitimacy and collective identity. As we have seen, at present there again exists if not an ideological confrontation, then certainly a fundamental incompatibility between the guiding principles and norms and the constructed identities of Russia and other authoritarian political systems in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, on the one hand, and the West, on the other. Between many Islamic fundamentalists and the West, the differences seem insurmountable.

Yet good governance covers a wide spectrum of state activities, and many of those need not be ideologically controversial, as long as governments involved in international cooperation on issues of good governance share one fundamental premise, namely that functioning statehood is desirable in principle. This assumption does not necessarily hold for any political authority – there are regimes that are exclusively concerned with exploiting their societies (and others) for their own purposes. Yet even the North Korean government had to recognize the limits of such an approach: beyond a certain point of collective suffering, it simply is unsustainable. Thus, the regime in Pyongyang eventually was forced to open up space for entrepreneurial and commercial activities.[17]

While unresolved territorial conflicts in Eastern Europe (e.g., between Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia, or

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17   See Lankov, Andrei: The Real North Korea, Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia, Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press 2013, Ch. 2.

between Armenia and Azerbaijan) remain important, they are no longer central to the pan-European security order. Issues of good or bad governance, however, are central already today, and will likely become even more important in the future. As fragile statehood creates risks and threats not only for the people concerned, but also for other states and peoples, they rightly have become objects of international concern, and they should become issues for the future agenda of pan-European co-operation. Nor should one assume that good governance concerns only governments and states in Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods of Europe: there is still room for improved governance in the Western Balkans, in Rumania, Bulgaria or Greece, and yes: even in Germany or Sweden.

Co-operative efforts at improving governance should not be ideologically controversial in areas such as the provision of public health, infrastructure, or tax collection. And again, the OSCE already provides tools and mechanisms, such as the High Commissioner on National Minorities or (more controversially) the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights that are relevant for good governance. They could become the basis for developing new, innovate instruments to deal with weaknesses in governance wherever governments are willing to co-operate (and benefit from external support in doing so).

Conclusions

This, then, are possible elements of the agenda for rebuilding a pan-European order, or – in the term of Robert Jervis, a pan-European "security regime". As we have argued above, for a variety of good reasons Germany has a particular interest, and a particular responsibility, in realizing this project. The OSCE probably offers the most suitable institutional framework for pursuing this aim at least with Russia, although OSCE membership does not cover fully the whole wider European region as defined here, which includes the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean basin. There is no doubt that the way to realize the project will be long and arduous. And it may even be blocked at times. As Robert Jervis has argued,[18] the establishment of security regimes requires the following prerequisites: first, there must be a great power or powers taking the initiative; second, all states must be persuaded that all others share their interest in establishing such a regime; third, all states must be reasonably satisfied with the status quo, and none must foster ambitions for unilateral expansion; and fourth and finally, the individual pursuit of security and war must be seen as costly. It may not be entirely clear whether all present member states, among them most importantly Russia, satisfy all those four conditions. As long as there exist such uncertainties, there will be a need to combine co-operative security policies with policies of individual and collective defence. And it is clear that non-state actors such as ISIS, even if they pose as states, do not meet any of the criteria and therefore cannot, and should not, be accommodated politically – they need to be fought. Yet wider Europe needs a functioning pan-European order to ensure its common security and well-being. The OSCE offers the best available framework to explore and develop this order, along its three traditional lines of co-operative security, economic, particularly energy exchanges, and good governance. The realization of the common European house of the Charter of Paris, which technically still remains in force as a politically, if not a legally binding document, could and should remain the ultimate ambition in this undertaking, in which Germany will have to play a leading role.

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18   Jervis, Robert: Security Regimes, in: International Organization, 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 357– 378 (360–2).

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