SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR

Helsinki+40 in the Historical Context

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DOI: 10.1163/18750230-02502004

Abstract

The Ukraine Crisis has negatively impacted the reform process 'Helsinki+40' of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The idea to conclude this process by holding an OSCE summit in 2015, celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, evaporated after Russia's annexation of Crimea. To overcome the differences with Moscow, it is necessary to compare two radically different narratives on the evolution of the OSCE after 1990. As long as historical facts are mixed with myths, a common vision of European security between Russia and the West remains a distant dream. In the meantime, 'common security' might be more relevant for today's OSCE than 'common values'.

Keywords

Russia – Ukraine crisis – CSCE process – Helsinki Final Act (1975) – Charter of Paris (1990) – Astana declaration (2010) – NATO enlargement – German reunification (1990) – Corfu process

Introduction

In July 2013, the designated future chairmanships of Switzerland (2014) and Serbia (2015) presented ten priorities for their joint two-year presidency of theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). One item on their list was the further development of the OSCE through the so-called Helsinki+40 reform process.[1] At the time, expectation had built up that Switzerland would push forward the debates on institutional reform and prepare the way for another OSCE summit meeting in mid-2015, to celebrate theachievement of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The idea of using the 40th anniversary of 'Helsinki 1975', the third and concluding stage of the Conference onSecurity and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) as an opportunity for the OSCEparticipating states to measure the progress being made towards the securitycommunity envisioned at an OSCE summit in Astana in 2010 had first beentossed around already in early 2011 by OSCE insiders. The Irish Chairmanship officially launched 'Helsinki+40' as a diplomatic project with a food-for-thought paper that was discussed among OSCE ambassadors in Vienna on 8–9 May 2012. When Serbia campaigned for the OSCE Chairmanship, the idea of an OSCE summit in 2015 to conclude the Helsinki+40 process was mentioned to Swiss officialsby Serbian Foreign Minister Boris Tadic already in early November 2011.[2]

By mid-2013, the summit idea had become conventional wisdom in OSCE circles. Academic observers like Matthias Bieri emphasized that 'a strategic document outlining the future shape and trajectory of the OSCE' was 'expected to be published in 2015' and that the OSCE wanted 'to use the 40th anniversaryto achieve results that provide the organization with an effective and coherentstrategic outlook'.[3] It was hoped that Switzerland and Serbia would 'build consensus for a summit declaration' and facilitate discussions on the modernization of conventional arms control in Europe, the enhancement of the OSCE'smediation capacities, and the fight against transnational threats.[4] Another OSCE expert, Stephanie Liechtenstein, wrote at the time: 'There are hopes that in 2015 there will be a landmark document that will consolidate the common *acquis* achieved during the last 40 years and provide strategic guidance for theOSCE's future work'. She added that it was hoped that a roadmap would soon arrive that

1 Swiss Confederation, Creating a Security Community for the Benefit of Everyone, July 2013.Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://www.OSCE.org/mc/109266.

2 E-mail correspondence with Swiss foreign ministry official, 24 February 2015. The Irish food-for-thought paper was dated 25 April 2012.

3 M. Bieri, 'Helsinki+40', in ISN Blog, 10 October 2013. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=170391.

4 Ibid.

would sketch out possible deliverables across eight thematic areas defined by the Ukrainian Chairmanship.[5] Serbian Foreign Minister Ivan Mrkic officially mentioned the idea of a 2015 summit in Belgrade in his statement atthe OSCE Ministerial meeting in Kyiv in December 2013.[6]

A month later, however, the Ukraine crisis interfered with, and negatively impacted on, the Helsinki+40 process. At the end of the Swiss OSCE chairmanship in December 2014, the 57 OSCE participating states did agree on an H+40declaration at the Ministerial Meeting in Basel. The decision vaguely mentioned that OSCE states would 'continue to use the OSCE as a platform for addressing European security', but a more explicit reference to the Panel ofEminent Persons on European Security as a common project, established by the OSCE 2015 Troika (Switzerland, Serbia, and Germany), was deleted from the draft decision.[7]

During 2014, momentum for a 2015 OSCE summit had been lost, and the ideawas dropped as a realistic option – just a little more than a year after there hadbeen a strong consensus for a new summit declaration to mark the Helsinki 1975 anniversary. On the surface, it seems that while in the fall of 2013 theHelsinki+40 process still was on track, the reform process collapsed during2014 – destroying all hopes for a landmark 2015 summit. Even if the OSCE is more divided than ever after the Swiss Chairmanship has ended, and even if itseems that consensus on how to proceed with institutional reforms is currentlynearly impossible to reach, it is not implied here that Switzerland is to blame for this development. Actually, the incoming Swiss chairmanship had beenrather skeptical about the prospects of achieving the summit goal already *before* taking charge, as a close reading of the public record shows. Swiss ForeignMinister Didier Burkhalter in his speech at the OSCE Ministerial Council inKyiv in December 2013 in fact distanced himself from the ambition to preparethe way for a 2015 OSCE summit in Belgrade. To my knowledge, that was the first public acknowledgment that expectations for an OSCE summit concluding the H+40 process might not be realized. Burkhalter said that 'an eventual OSCE summit in Serbia should not take place automatically, but be made contingent on enough progress being made in the Helsinki+40 reform process.'[8]

Thus, it would be wrong to attribute the cancellation of the original summitplans to the Ukraine crisis. Rather, the Swiss had already doubted in earlyDecember 2013 whether sufficient progress would be achieved in the following year to legitimize a summit in 2015. But the Ukraine crisis put the Helsinki+40discussions on hold, and by early 2015, talk of an OSCE summit had all but disappeared. Instead, the Serbian Chairmanship settled for organizing a commemorative event in Helsinki in July 2015, which will at best be an informal OSCE foreign ministers' meeting, but may also take place without high-levelrepresentation.[9]

It is becoming increasingly difficult to shape consensus within the OSCE forreforming the organization and adapting it meaningfully to the post-Cold Warsecurity environment. In order to understand why, it is necessary to look backat the roots of the Helsinki+40 process and provide some historical backgroundto the debate on the future of the OSCE

5 S. Liechtenstein, 'The Helsinki+40 Process: Determining the Future of the OSCE', in Security and Human Rights Blog, 23 September 2013. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://www.shrblog.org/blog/The_Helsinki_40_Process__Determining_the_Future_of_the_OSCE.html?id=401.

6 I. Mrkic, Statement at the 20th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Kyiv, 5 December 2013, MC.DEL/33/13, 6 December 2013. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://www.OSCE.org/mc/109283.

7 C. Nünlist, 'Summing Up Switzerland's 2014 Chairmanship of the OSCE', in ISN Blog, 23 December 2014. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/ summing-up-switzerlands-2014-chairmanship-of-the-OSCE. See also OSCE, Declaration on Further Steps in the Helsinki+40 Process, MC.DOC/1/14, 5 December 2014. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://www.OSCE.org/cio/131266.

8 D. Burkhalter, Common Security Delivered by All and for All, Statement delivered at PlenarySession of the Ministerial Council of the OSCE, Kyiv, 5 December 2013, MC.DEL/1/13. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://www.OSCE.org/mc/109215.

9 E-mail correspondence with Swiss foreign ministry official, 24 February 2015.

and its continued relevance after theCold War period. The following review focuses on recurring criticisms and the two dominant, but divergent narratives that prevent agreement on a common vision of European security for the 21st century.

OSCE Reforms: The Western Narrative

For the West, the relationship with the CSCE/OSCE was not love at first sight.Originally, the plan to convene a pan-European security conference had been a Soviet idea going back to a proposal of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in 1954. The Soviet aim at the time was to drive the United States out of Europeand for Russia to become a hegemon in continental Europe. In the mid-1960s,the Soviet calls for a European Security Conference to legitimize the borders of 1945 were again perceived in the West as a Soviet initiative to cement the territorial status quo in Europe and to finally gain recognition of post-war European borders, including divided Germany.[10] At some point, however, Western diplomats, including Edouard Brunner from Switzerland, realized thatthe West could get something in return – and they concentrated their diplomacy in the early Helsinki process on respect for human rights.[11] In year-long multilateral negotiations in Helsinki and Geneva from 1972 to 1975, Western diplomats succeeded in linking the principle of self-determination and individual human rights with the notion of security.[12]

In retrospect, the Final Helsinki Act of 1975 is often celebrated as the beginning of the end of the Cold War. It is argued that a direct line led from thecodification of individual human rights to East European dissidents and the peaceful revolution of 1989.[13] In 1975, however, the Western perception of 'Helsinki 1975' was rather different. In the West, the Helsinki Final Act was regarded as a victory of the Soviet Union over the West, as a 'sell-out', since the West had sanctioned the partition of Europe. Swiss diplomat Ernesto Thalmann, who was involved in the negotiations, wrote in an internal document: 'The whole agreement will sink into oblivion once the signatures from Helsinki are dried.'[14]

Only much later did it become clear that the Western European strategy of insisting that respect for human rights be included among the agreed key principles, together with self-determination and inviolability of borders, had been a brilliant, visionary strategy. Its full potential played out in combination withthe regular follow-up CSCE conferences that checked the state of play of how the CSCE principles were implemented in CSCE participating states. The credit for this strategy belongs to the nine Western European countries that formed the European Communities at the time.[15] Their perception of détente as adynamic process contrasted with the view of both Washington and Moscow, which aimed at stabilizing the status quo. The 'EC Nine' also shared many more core values than the NATO members, which included states like Greece, Turkey,and Portugal that did not support the Western human rights agenda. Althoughnot recognized at the time, the new notion of security introduced by the ECNine in 1975 amounted to a revolution. All 35 CSCE founding members, including the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, acknowledged that

10 See H. Hurlburt, 'Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture', in Helsinki Monitor 1995, no. 2, pp. 5–20; M.-P. Rey, 'The USSR and the Helsinki Process, 1969–75:Optimism, Doubt, or Defiance?', in A. Wenger et al. (eds.), Origins of the European SecuritySystem: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75, London, 2008, pp. 65–81.

11 P. Widmer, Schweizer Aussenpolitik und Diplomatie, Zürich, 2003, pp. 383–393.

12 J. Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973–1975,Durham, 1987.

13 D. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise ofCommunism, Princeton, 2001; S. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of The Cold War, Cambridge, 2011.

14 Quoted in C. Nünlist, 'Expanding the East-West Dialog beyond the Bloc Division: The Neutrals as Negotiators and Mediators', in Wenger et al. (eds.), Origins of the EuropeanSecurity System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75, London, 2008, pp. 201–221, p. 213.

15 D. Möckli, 'The EC Nine, the CSCE, and the Changing Pattern of European Security', in A. Wenger et al. (eds.), Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75, London, 2008, pp. 145–163.

respect forhuman rights was a condition for peace and that the security of individuals was complementary to the security of states. The static principle of inviolability of frontiers was qualified with the dynamic right to peaceful border changes – which made German unification possible in 1990.[16]

The triumph of the West in ending the Cold War fundamentally transformedthe CSCE. In the 1990s, the institutionalized OSCE built tools to introduce and strengthen democracy, rule of law, and confidence-building in the Balkans andthe post-Soviet space, mainly through election observation and field missions.[17] The 1990 Charter of Paris celebrated the victory of democracy in thespirit of Fukuyama's famous 'end of history' thesis, gave post-Cold War substance to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, turning the CSCE from a community of security into a community of values based on solidarity, and set forth the visionof a new Europe, free of dividing lines.[18]

However, in the mid-1990s the OSCE became a victim of its own success.Once democracy had spread to the East and once the Balkans were stabilized,the OSCE lost its relevance – not least because other European security institutions, including the expanded EU and NATO, competed with it, albeit with much bigger financial resources.[19] When violence broke out in Georgia in 2008 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the OSCE was unable to play a substantive role inde-escalating the conflicts.[20] The success story of the OSCE's transformation in the 1990s had come to an end.

Compared with the malaise within the OSCE in the early 21st century, theorganization played a useful role in the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Neither the EU,nor NATO, nor the United Nations could contribute in any meaningful way tode-escalation of the conflict. The OSCE, however, played out its entire toolbox of conflict management instruments and played useful roles with its Special Monitoring Mission, its international contact groups, special representatives, military verification missions, and border observations mission.[21] For the West,it was certainly useful in 2014 that the OSCE did still exist – even if the OSCEcould not prevent the Ukraine war from further escalating either.

OSCE Reforms: The Russian Narrative

The Russian narrative of the evolution of the CSCE/OSCE markedly differs from the Western perspective. While the European security conference originally was, as mentioned, a Soviet idea and became the pet project of Sovietleader Leonid Brezhnev's détente policy in the 1970s, the Soviets soon got tiredof human rights tribunals taking place at CSCE follow-up conferences after1977. Only under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin was the CSCE again seenas a useful instrument to advance Russian interests in Europe. In fact, Moscowsubscribed to the

16 Ibid. See also A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the WestShaped the Helsinki CSCE, Brussels, 2009.

17 M. P. de Brichambaut, 'The OSCE: Status Quo and Future Perspectives', in J. Pucher and J. Frank (eds.), Strategie und Sicherheit 2011, Wien, 2011, pp. 489–498, at p. 491.

18 OSCE, A New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity: Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 1990. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://www.OSCE.org/mc/39516.

19 D. Trachsler, 'The OSCE: Fighting for Renewed Relevance', CSS Analysis in Security Policy no. 110 (2012); W. Richter, 'Sicherheitsgemeinschaft OSZE', in SWPAktuell 2013, no. 17.

20 J. Taalas / K. Möttölä, 'The Spirit of Helsinki 2.0: The Finnish Chairmanship 2008', in OSCE Yearbook 2009, Baden-Baden, 2010, pp. 319–332; F. Evers, 'OSCE Conflict Management and the Kyrgyz Experience in 2010', in: core Working Paper, 2012, no. 4. In August 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy negotiated as rotating EU president a peace deal with Russia, overshadowing the crisis management efforts of the Finnish Chairmanship-in-Office.

21 C. Nünlist, 'Testfall Ukraine-Krise: Das Konfliktmanagement der OSZE unter Schweizer Vorsitz', in Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik, 2014, pp. 35–61. See also C. Nünlist and D. Svarin (eds.), Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis, Zurich, 2014. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/ Perspectives-on-the-Role-of-the-OSCE-in-the-Ukraine-Crisis.pdf.

Western notions of democracy and human rights in the 1990Paris Charter. At that point in time, Western and Eastern aspirations for a newEurope seemed in close harmony – it was a golden, but also brief moment forthe CSCE.[22]

Already in 1993, however, relations between the United States and Russia started to deteriorate, and Russia increasingly disliked the direction the CSCE/OSCE was taking. Russian complaints about US security policy in Europe included criticism of the expansion of NATO; the military interference in Bosnia and Kosovo; alleged Western support for the colour revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005); us plans for a missile defence system with elements in Eastern Europe; and Western recognition of Kosovo's statehood (2008).[23]

An interesting starting point for the diverging Russian narrative is the controversial 'betrayal of 1990', when Western leaders apparently promised Sovietleader Gorbachev to never enlarge NATO eastwards, 'not an inch'[24] – a promise the us later broke under Bill Clinton with NATO's enlargement in 1999, and then again under George W. Bush in 2004 and with offers to absorb Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance as well in 2008. For Putin, Georgia and Ukraine marked the overstepping of a 'red line', and he responded both in 2008 andagain in 2014 with military means to prevent them from choosing their alliancemembership – a right explicitly mentioned in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. In 2007, Putin famously characterized the OSCE as a 'vulgar instrument' of theWest, advancing Western interests at Russia's expense.[25] For Moscow, OSCEelection monitoring missions and field missions to monitor the implementation of respect for human rights and other Helsinki principles contradicted theOSCE principles of non-intervention in domestic affairs and state sovereignty. Other authoritarian regimes 'East of Warsaw' began to support Moscow's obstructionism.[26]

A few months before the 2008 Georgia War, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev re-launched the discussion about reforming the OSCE and adapting it to the 21st century with a speech in Berlin – a discussion that led to several reform projects, including the ongoing Helsinki+40 process. Medvedev suggested convening a pan-European summit to negotiate a new European Security Treaty, a legally binding non-aggression treaty that would emphasizethe renunciation of violence, the principle of indivisibility of security, andarms control.[27] Medvedev's Berlin proposal, which is currently being revisitedagain, intended to radically change the OSCE and to reduce us influence in Europe by giving the OSCE legal competence or even a veto over NATO and the EU – going back to the original Soviet idea of the 1950s that had triggeredthe Helsinki process and to Russian reform proposals of 1993–4. However, the OSCE under Finnish and Greek chairmanships in 2008–9 cleverly seized Medvedev's initiative, which was aimed at replacing the OSCE with a legally binding pan-European security treaty, and integrated it into an internal reformprocess of the organization that included Russia. Russia's active involvement in the so-called

22 V.-Y. Ghebali, 'Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Pan-European Expectations', in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2005, no. 3, pp. 375–388, at pp.376–379; P. Dunay, 'The OSCE in the East: The Lesser Evil', in C. Nünlist and D. Svarin (eds.), Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the UkraineCrisis, Zurich, 2014, pp. 17–22.

23 Ghebali, Growing Pains, pp. 379–381; E. Kropatcheva, 'The Evolution of Russia's OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis', in Journal ofContemporary European Studies, 2015, pp. 1–19, at pp. 5–10.

24 G. Bush and B. Scowcroft, A World Transformed, New York, 1998, p. 239.

25 RIA Novosti, 'Präsident Putin: Monopolare Welt ist undemokratisch und gefährlich',Munich, 10 February 2007. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://de.rian.ru/comments_interviews/20070213/60672011.html.

26 See D. Lynch, 'The State of the OSCE', in The EURussia Centre Review, 2009, no. 12, pp. 5–13; W. Zellner, 'Identifying the Cutting Edge: The Future Importance of the OSCE', in: CORE Working Paper, 2007, no. 17, p. 14; P. T. Hopmann, 'The Future Impact of the OSCE', in OSCE Yearbook 2010, Baden-Baden, 2011, pp. 75–90, at pp. 80f.; Dunay, The OSCE and the East, p. 18.

27 A. Zagorski, 'The Russian Proposal for a Treaty on European Security: From the Medvedev Initiative to the Corfu Process', in OSCE Yearbook, 2009, pp. 43–59, at p. 44. Already in 1993–94, Russia had advocated a legally binding treaty-based new European Security organization, but the West had rejected the Russian proposals.

'Corfu Process' in 2009 thus was a major success for the OSCE.[28] In 2009, us-Russian relations improved due to Barack Obama's election and his 'reset policy' that inadvertently rewarded Putin's aggression in Georgia with improved relations with Washington just a few months later.

The reform process triggered by Medvedev in 2008 succeeded with the convening of an OSCE summit in 2010 in Astana, the first summit in 11 years. In Astana, 56 OSCE participating states adopted a political declaration reaffirming the principles of Helsinki 1975, Paris 1990, and Istanbul 1999, and defined as a common OSCE vision a 'free, democratic, common, and indivisible security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok'.[29] The declaration emphasized that existing human rights and civil rights were sacrosanct and not negotiable.Apparently, an eight-page working plan on concrete steps for achieving thisambition had been agreed to 95 percent in Astana, but the us, Georgia, andMoldova refused to accept the sections on frozen conflicts.[30]

Since the Astana summit, Russia and other 'spoiler states' (states with singular national interests that use their veto power to sabotage OSCE decisions requiring unanimous consent) have blocked all major substantial progress in OSCE activities. In 2011, 18 of 30 decisions prepared by the Lithuanian chairmanship were vetoed at the Ministerial meeting in Vilnius.[31] 2012 only saw progress in dealing with transnational threats.[32] Ukraine in 2013 was mostly busy with the struggle between the EU and Russia over Ukraine's geopolitical direction, although some notable progress was achieved at the Kyiv ministerial. For example, a cyber-security declaration was adopted focusing on confidence-building measures. Other decisions dealt with energy security and the protection of critical infrastructure. Moreover, for the first time since 2010,decisions were taken on issues affecting the human dimension.[33]

The Ukrainian Chairmanship was also the first to implement the OSCE Ministerial decision of Dublin in December 2012 to officially launch the Helsinki+40 reform process. In 2013, Kyiv set up informal H+40 Working Groups in Vienna. Eight topics were defined for discussion, including modernization of conventional arms control in Europe, enhancing capacities in addressingtransnational threats, strengthening capacities across the conflict cycle, achieving progress towards the settlement of protracted conflicts, and strengthening the human dimension.[34]

Facts Versus Myths

Diverging historical narratives on the evolution of the post-Cold War orderin Europe have become a huge challenge for OSCE reform processes, and they remain a hurdle for overcoming East-West tensions. Radically different versions of how the cooperative security atmosphere of the early 1990s collapsed and led

28 Lynch, State of the OSCE, p. 12.

29 OSCE, Astana Commemorative Declaration towards a Security Community, SUM.DOC/1/10/ Corr.1, 3 December 2010. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://www.OSCE.org/cio/74985.

30 W. Zellner, 'Das OSZE-Gipfeltreffen von Astana im Jahr 2010: Eine vorläufige Bewertung',in OSZEJahrbuch, 2010, pp. 31–23, at p. 26. Apparently, the us delegation pushed for a sharper formulation to avoid giving the us Senate, dominated by the Republicans, a pretext to block ratification of the New start Treaty.

31 T. Janeliunas, 'The Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship: Lessons and Dilemmas', in LithuanianAnnual Strategic Review, 2013, no. 1, pp. 59–86, at p. 76.

32 F. Cogan, 'Reflections on Ireland's Chairmanship of the OSCE, 2012', in Security and Human Rights, 2013, no. 1, pp. 17–27.

33 C. Nünlist, 'The OSCE after the Kyiv Ministerial Meeting', in ISN Blog, 13 December 2013. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/the-OSCE-after-the-kyiv-ministerial. See also M. Rojansky, 'Summing Up Ukraine's 2013 OSCE Chairmanship', in ISN Blog, 20 December 2013. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=174714; S. Liechtenstein, 'The 2013 OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Kyiv: Addressing Persistent Dividing Lines', in Security and Human Rights 2014, nos. 3–4, pp. 307–324.

34 Liechtenstein,' Helsinki+40 Process'; J.-M. Flükiger, 'H+40: Presentation for the OSCE Youth Ambassadors', 5 December 2014, OSCE Ministerial Council, Basel.

to unprecedented tension between the West and Russia in 2014nourish mistrust within the OSCE. In 2012, the incoming Ukrainian Chairman-in-Office, Konstyantyn Gryshchenko, had chosen the need for historical reconciliation to build trust in the OSCE space as one top priority for the 2013 Chairmanship. However, when he became Deputy Prime Minister in December2012 and Leonid Kozhara became Foreign Minister and thus OSCE Chairman-in-Office, the topic of reconciliation disappeared from the Chairmanship agenda before the 2013 chairmanship had even started.[35] This was very regrettable. The Serbian, German, and Austrian OSCE chairmanships would be well advised to take up this topic and to address the different versions of the past.

To give one example of how historical myths can make international relations emotional and difficult, let us return to the 'betrayal of 1990' and NATO enlargement. Again and again in the last 15 years, Russian representatives, including President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, havecomplained, as they still do today, that the us had promised in 1990 not toaccept former Warsaw Pact members into NATO.[36] The story of how JamesBaker promised to Mikhail Gorbachev not to move NATO 'one inch eastward' has developed a life of its own. Interestingly enough, all of the relevant high-level meetings between Baker and Shevardnadze or between Gorbachev and Kohl in February 1990 have been recorded, and the minutes of the meetings areavailable at governmental archives.[37] Historians Mark Kramer, Mary Sarotte,and Kristina Spohr, who have studied these archival records, have researched this question. In addition, Svetlana Savranskaya has published the most important documents in the volume *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989* (2010).[38] Their conclusion is clear: In February 1990, NATO expansion was not an issue. The Warsaw Pact still existed at that time. The only Warsaw Pact member discussed between the us, Germany, and the Soviet Union was East Germany. The GDR was permitted to become a NATOmember as part of reunified Germany, but no NATO troops, no NATO installations, and no NATO nuclear weapons were to be allowed in the formerly Eastern part. At the time, it was unthinkable that countries like Poland, CzechRepublic, or Romania would ever join NATO. Recently, even Gorbachev hasgone on record and did clarify that the alleged 'no inch eastward' promise is amyth, not a fact.[39] In 1990, only German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher believed that a new cooperative security architecture in the spirit of the OSCE would supersede the Cold War alliances and seemed ready to close the door of NATO to Poland and Hungary. Yet, Genscher was merely sounding out Western options and in no way had the authority to speak forNATO or even the Kohl government, let alone for Warsaw and Budapest.[40]

The Way Forward

What can be learned from this short history of the Helsinki process and thedivergent narratives since 1990? How do increasing dividing lines within the OSCE impact the Helsinki+40 reform process? One of the key challenges

35 Rojansky, Summing Up Ukraine's 2013 OSCE Chairmanship.

36 'A Conversation With Sergei Lavrov', in Charlie Rose Show, PBS, 25 September 2008; Address by President Putin in Sevastopol, 18 March 2014. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889.

37 S. Savranskaya et al. (eds.), Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989, Budapest/New York, 2010, pp. 91–94, 675–687.

38 K. Spohr, 'Precluded or Precedent-Setting? The NATO Enlargement Question in the Triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990–1991', in Journal of Cold War Studies, 2012, no. 4, pp. 4–54. See also M. E. Sarotte, 'Not an Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev, and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement inFebruary 1990', in Diplomatic History, 2010, no. 1, pp. 119–140; M. Kramer, 'The Myth of aNo-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia', in Washington Quarterly, 2009, no. 3, pp. 29–62.

39 M. Korshunov, 'Mikhail Gorbachev: I Am Against All Walls', in Russia Beyond the Headlines,

16 October 2014. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://rbth.co.uk/international/2014/10/ 16/mikhail_gorbachev_i_am_against_all_walls_40673. html. See also M. Rühle, 'NATO Enlargement and Russia: Discerning Fact from Fiction', in American Foreign Policy Interests, 2014, no. 4, pp. 234–239; Jack Matlock, NATO Expansion: Was there a Promise?,3 April 2014. Retrieved 6 February 2015, http://jackmatlock.com/2014/04/NATO-expansion-was-there-a-promise.

40 Spohr, The NATO Enlargement Question, pp. 13–21, 30–35, 44f., 50.

for the OSCE in 2015 and beyond will be to reflect upon the main function of the organization. Does it make sense to adhere to the glorious vision of the1990 Charter of Paris and to insist on a Western view of the OSCE as a community of values – a vision that Russia only shared for a very short time in history,but which Russia and other OSCE members currently do not share anymore?Does it really make sense for the OSCE to aspire to be a Western agency exporting Western values to Eurasia?

Maybe the more attractive way forward is to revisit the traditional role of theCSCE during the Cold War. Should not the OSCE's main function once more be to build trust across the dividing lines? To keep open the dialogue with Russia?To re-establish the right balance between the politico-military aspects of security, economic and ecological aspects, and human security? Originally, the CSCEwas not a community of values like NATO or the EU. It was not meant to be acommunity of values. Western and Eastern concepts of security were respected.States with very different values from different cultures and with different historical experiences came together and through consensus-building establishedcommon rules and principles to guide peaceful relations between states.[41]

The Ukraine crisis has proven that in 2015 and beyond, there is still need forsuch an 'old OSCE'. This security community was made for bad weather. It changed into a different organization when the weather was good in the early 1990s. Now that the weather has turned worse again, maybe the OSCE needsto change again – back to the 'Cold War OSCE' – back to 'common security' from Vancouver to Vladivostok rather than 'common (Western) values' in the EuroAtlantic and Eurasian security community. The Helsinki+40 reform process offers a unique opportunity to chart a strategic course for European security after Russia's annexation of the Crimea – even if no OSCE summit will be held in 2015.

41 Lynch, State of the OSCE, p. 6.

This article was first published with Brill | Nijhoff publishers, and was featured on the Security and Human Rights Monitor (SHRM) website.

Security and Human Rights (formerly Helsinki Monitor) is a journal devoted to issues inspired by the work and principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It looks at the challenge of building security through cooperation across the northern hemisphere, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, as well as how this experience can be applied to other parts of the world. It aims to stimulate thinking on the question of protecting and promoting human rights in a world faced with serious threats to security.

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