Europe: Strategies for Co-operation and Joint Solutions

Adam Daniel Rotfeld
Warsaw University
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland
Co-chairman of the Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters Former Director of
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1990–2002

Abstract

The article examines the sustainability and adaptability of European security institutions, structures and organizations in the context of the fundamental and qualitative change of the post-Helsinki European security order. Suggestions are presented for managing the Ukraine crisis by military and political restraint, the observance of the Helsinki Decalogue of principles and by upgrading executive mechanisms of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In a new European security order, the core political components would be constituted by the inviolability of frontiers and the incontestability of internal political order. In broader international change, the relative decrease of the role of old powers has to be accommodated with the growing clout of emerging powers. Since most of the conflicts take place within the States and not between them the risks and new threats have to be dealt with by transformed and upgraded security institutions adapted to the new security environment. At the same time, there is a manifested lack of interests by the great powers to rely on multilateral security institutions unless they are used as instruments in pursuing their own strategies. The new common security arrangement for the West and Russia has to reconcile the adversary national security interests within the Euro-Atlantic Security Forum.

Keywords

Helsinki Final Act – end of the cold war – new types of conflicts – polycentric world order – adjustment of the OSCE Institutions

Introductory Remarks

A point of departure in search for a new security order is the fundamental andqualitative change of circumstances in the post-Helsinki European securitysystem. It is a consequence of the Russian incorporation of Crimea and thearmed conflict in and around the South-Eastern Ukraine. In this context there is a need to respond to the question: what are the major weaknesses of theEuro-Atlantic security order in the second decade of the 21st century?

At the intellectual level, experts and scholars would normally answer thequestion by saying that security institutions, structures and organizations being static by nature, address the needs and requirements of the time whenthey were established. On the other hand, risks, threats and challenges are by their nature dynamic. Consequently, the mandates of security institutions do not correspond to new, changed and changing needs.

Logical and reasonable as it may be, this way of thinking fails to explain thepolitical gist of the matter. After all, some organizations are set up to accomplish a specific task and fade away once their mandate expires, unless the countries concerned agree on a new mandate in time.

The conflict in Ukraine prompts deep reflection and reaffirms the importance of the military factor and its role in preventing conflicts by deterringpotential aggressors in the post-cold war period.

An argument raised quite often is that the world and Europe risk slidingback into a 'cold war'.[1] Such an assertion reflects thinking in terms of the past rather than offering a future-oriented perspective.

Today's threats are of a different nature. During the Cold War, the East-Westrelations were characterized by ideological hostility which spread to all fieldsof relations between the two blocs: politics and the economy, military

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1   Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, 'Consequences of a New Cold War', in Survival, vol. 57, no. 2, April-May 2015, pp. 37–46.

andhumanitarian issues. The post-cold war era has de-ideologized the relationsamong the states. In non-democratic countries it has meant a return to treating the military potential as an instrument of pressure and arm-wrestling and bringing the weaker countries under the control of the stronger ones. Such acode of conduct represents a return to the old concept of "zones of influence" or "privileged interests", with which contrary to undertaken commitmentsthe global powers would have the right to surround themselves.

In fact, the authoritarian regimes of Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus do not accept the set of European values. In their view, the commitments taken under the Helsinki Final Act to freedom and civil liberties, and more broadly to human rights in fact represent a form of threat, possibly leading to "regime change". Leaders of authoritarian governments fear that public angercould trigger a revolt and eventually a regime change. This explains the aversion to values promoted by the process initiated 40 years ago in Helsinki.

As the result of the collapse of totalitarian regimes in Central Europe andRussia, the international security order was best described as being partially uncertain, unstable, ambiguous and unreliable, hence the phenomenon of political unpredictability. It is a state of affairs in which old dangers have not disappeared and continue to persist, while effective mechanisms and procedures are yet to be found to prevent and counter new dangers. These include the stoking of irredentism, and "rebellious wars" which destabilize and weakencountries, allowing the attainment of political, economic and military objectives by proxy, i.e. without deploying one's own military forces in the territoryof the country against which these actions are directed.[2]

This development entails the need to increase European defence budgetsand adapt them adequately to new threats.[3] This will become possible in practice once resistance to increasing military expenditures inside the EuropeanUnion is overcome, and the NATO and EU countries make a joint decision about their common defence and security strategies.

Back to the Future

There is a recurrent problem at hand. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, differentconcepts and proposals on how to adapt the old bipolar system to the new reality were put forward.[4] Some questions that were asked 25 years ago have not lost their relevance. Theoreticians and practitioners of international relations had difficulty correctly diagnosing and identifying the essence of the newsystem.

At the beginning of 1990s, John J. Mearsheimer advanced a concept thatafter the cold war Europe was entering

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2   In the context of weakening Ukraine, political destabilization and dysfunctionality, and setting in motion the country's disintegration, a number of Russian military magazines (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, Znanie-Vlast) recalled the concept of 'rebellious war' (myatezhevoyna), which had been put forward by Evgeny Eduardovich Messner (1891–1974). In the 1960s, Messner published in Argentina several studies on a new concept of war: Myatezh—imya tretey vsemirnoy; Vsemirnaya myatezhevoyna, published by Kuchkovo Pole, Moscow 2004. The central point made by the author is that "rebellious wars are battles for the souls of a struggling nation." This theory is exemplified by operations in the east and south of Ukraine. For more see: 'Putin walczy o duszę Rosji' ('Putin's Battle for Russia's Soul'), an interview with Adam D. Rotfeld, in Gazeta Wyborcza, 26 March 2014, Polityka Ekstra, pp. 10–11.

3   Only four NATO countries spend up to 2014 at least 2 per cent on their armed forces: the United States, Great Britain, Greece and Estonia (us military budget accounts for 73 per cent of all spending by 28 NATO countries). Cf. Heather Conley, 'Is it fair to say there is no EuroAtlantic security approach?', in CSIS, Washington D.C., May 16, 2014. Poland joined this group of States in May 2015.

4   For an attempt at a systemic approach to the analysis of the new reality, see the collection of papers by 28 authors from the United States, Germany, France, the UK, Russia, Sweden, Italy, Canada and Poland, Hans J. Giessmann, Roman Kuźniar, Zdzisław Lachowski (eds.), International Security in a Time of Change: Threats Concepts Institutions, Festschrift for Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2004.

a time of instability that would be marked by traditional conflicts rooted in history.[5] Like many other scholars, Mearsheimer believed that the cold war rules had saved Europe from a hot war,while the disappearing bipolar system was by definition more likely to ensurestability than any multipolar system.[6]

In the mid-1990s, the French scholar Pierre Hassner offered an analysis of six models of the post-cold war evolution of the international system.[7] Histwo models assumed that conflicts could be overcome and prevented and that cooperation would prevail. The other two options of possible post-cold war changes were based on a concept of permanent rivalry among countries or groups of countries ('multipolarity'), or on the anticipated 'clash of civilizations';[8] finally, the last two models posited an enduring opposition between the global centre and peripheries. According to this theory, the rich North would curb its contacts with the poor South so as to safeguard stability and prosperity, while, at the same time, neutralizing the negative effectsof 'fringe' conflicts and striving to de-escalate or 'freeze' them.[9] Hassner assumed that if put into practice, this model would divide for good the world into two parts which would gradually drift apart. In his view, after the cold war international relations more than ever are governed by the principle: "everything is connected with everything else, but nobody withanybody else."[10]

In the 1990s, analysts were by and large right in assuming that even as globalization processes accelerated, the international system needed new globally applicable universal norms in order to function. The strength of this argument was somewhat weakened by its proponents who assumed that interstate regulations would offer solutions, without realising that today most of theproblems and potential conflicts emerge within states and not between them.[11]

The New Type of Conflicts

In the Euro-Atlantic space the blurring of the line of division between what isexternal and what is 'essentially' internal (within the domestic competenceand cannot be formally subject to an intervention by the un or any other country) ceased to exist.[12]

Most of the conflicts erupted not between the states but within them. The international system that took shape after the end of the cold war invoked common liberal and democratic values, as opposed to the order that was basedon mutual deterrence. The principles and norms that were invoked implied a democratic political system, the

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5   J. J. Mearsheimer: 'Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War', in International Security, vol. 15, no. 11 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–56.

6   See: Adam D. Rotfeld, 'New security structures in Europe: concepts, proposals and decisions', in SIPRI Yearbook 1991, Oxford, 1991, pp. 585–600.

7   Pierre Hassner, 'Beyond the Three Traditions. The Philosophy of War and Peace in Historical Perspective', in International Affairs, 1994, vol. 70, no. 4.

8   Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, 1996.

9   Max Singer, Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil, New York, 1993.

10   Hassner, op. cit., p. 45.

11   I have pointed this out for the first time in my essay 'The fundamental change and the new security agenda', in SIPRI Yearbook 1992, Oxford, 1992, pp. 1–8. I argued that the line between what constitutes internal and external threats was being blurred and becoming fuzzy. My understanding was that the weakness of the emerging new international system stems from the fact that "(…) the international system and the means available to international security organizations have been tailored to resolving conflicts between states, not within them": 'The new security environment', in SIPRI Yearbook 1993, Oxford, 1993, p. 2. For more on this, see A.D. Rotfeld, Euro-Atlantic Security: Continuity and Change, Warsaw, Academy of National Defence, April 2013.

12   Cf. Art. 2.7 of the Charter of the United Nations.

rule of law, political pluralism, market economy, freedom of speech, respect for civil rights and liberties, tolerance, and respect for human rights in all spheres of human activity. It was assumed that bipolarity based on the balance of power and the philosophy of exclusiveness would make a way for a new order founded on interdependence, the harmonization of interests, and inclusiveness in place of exclusion. Moral and ethical values, and the rule of law, rather than military might and economic cloutwere to play a central role. In other words, the new international order unlike bipolarity in the past was to be founded not on the use of force but on the force of law.

The concept of promoting democracy and regime change around the world – from the oppressive dictatorships to the democracies based on rule oflaw – gained popularity. The 2000 Warsaw Meeting of 108 foreign ministers adopted a document *Towards a Community of Democracies*, which set out anaction plan for countries whose governments respected democratic principles and procedures, and for countries which declared their aspirations to a democratic form of government.[13]

Democratic and liberal thinkers, as well as decision-makers, tend to believethat agreements and normative regulations suffice to charter a new international security order.

It is not so.

Institutions vs Security

The trust placed on mechanisms and institutions and the belief that they canbe relied upon leads to bitter disappointments when well-established instruments fail a stress test during serious tensions between countries, and in crises.This is because the effectiveness of any security system depends on the state'swillingness and commitment to uphold values and interests which have justified the need of setting up specific structures and institutions.

In fact, institutions are called into being at a given moment in history andthey respond to the needs and requirements of the time and the conditionswhich made a specific form of organizing security possible and necessary.However, some institutions lose their importance, get marginalized or incorporated into other structures as time goes by and new historical circumstancesemerge.[14]

It is not the formal or organizational aspects that decide whether a security institution is important and viable, but rather the political commitment of countries and their security interest in using the tools that make it easier tocarry out tasks which justified the creation of a specific structure to begin with.In other words, institutional shortcomings and organizational deficits should not be viewed as the main reason for the ineffectiveness of a security system.

A weak point of the current system regionally and globally is the false assumption that the member states of the

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13   The aim of the meeting of 108 foreign ministers in Warsaw was to demonstrate the willingness to shape an international security order founded on democratic principles. The conference was called on the initiative of us Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek. The meeting's outcome, the Warsaw Declaration entitled "Towards a Community of Democracies" (Warsaw, May 2000), was published in a special edition of the quarterly Sprawy Międzynarodowe and in the original English-language version (27 June 2000) in the Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, vol. 9, n° 2 (2000) Supplement.

14   The Western European Union (WEU) is an example of a security institution which never played the role its member states wanted to assign to it upon signing the Treaty of Brussels (1948). The WEU's tasks and functions were fulfilled by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in accordance with the Washington Treaty (1949), and by the European Union following the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht, which became effective on 1 November 1993.

United Nations or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe adhere to the same values defined as universal or common European values. The recent crisis in and around Ukrainedemonstrates that these liberal values are, in fact, not universally recognized.

Proposals and Projects

In 2008–2012, the academic community in Russia launched a project aimed atfinding a new formula for cooperative security. An intention was to conceptualize the proposal made by President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation for a new European Security Treaty.[15] One has to note in this context the publications by the Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR),a research unit established after Medvedev's election as President, backing him up with scholarly expertise. INSOR pursued close cooperation with the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the most serious branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences concerned with social sciences. Both research teams would formulate concepts based on the assumption that Russia would embark on a liberal and democratic path of development.[16]

In their study The Architecture of Euro-Atlantic Security[17] the INSOR team wrote:

Our objective interest today is to generate not so much [a] fear of Russia (because it is strong and barely containable) but [a] respect towards it (because it is strong and keen to pursue responsible and cooperative policies).[18]

Unfortunately, the choice made by the Russian political leadership was a different one. Decisions were taken to construct the national defence and security based not on interdependence but on the use of force, not on predictabilityand cooperation but on intimidation, extortion, and imposing on neighbours the concept of "limited sovereignty" and making them dependent on Russia'sstrategy and interests.

In his statement made in front of the German Bundestag Polish PresidentBronisław Komorowski (10 Sept. 2014) clarified that Poland and all the otherWestern democracies were engaged genuinely in establishing partnership with Russia based on mutual respect and partnership. Unfortunately Russia made its own choice ignoring the common values and principles.

There is a growing understanding among the most eminent scholars taking part in intellectual debates in the West that the foundation of a new globalsystem and world order must take account of the fact that liberal democracy and its values and principles are recognized only by the transatlantic community of countries.[19]

In the current situation groups comprised of intellectuals, thinkers and scholars and former politicians should make the decision-makers aware that the time is ripe of revaluating the old concepts and working out new concepts

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15   See more: Adam D. Rotfeld, 'Does Europe Need a New Security Architecture?' in OSCE Yearbook 2009,, Hamburg, 2010, pp. 23–42.

16   Two publications in particular deserved an attention: Igor Y. Yurgens, Alexander A. Dynkin, Vladimir G. Baranovsky (eds.), Arhitektura evroatlanticheskoy bezopasnosti (Architecture of Euro-Atlantic Security), Ekon-Inform, Moscow, 2009; and the monograph A.A. Dynkin and I.S. Ivanov (eds.) Evroatlanticheskoe prostranstvo bezopasnosti (EuroAtlantic Security Space), imemo, Moscow, 2011.

17   Arhitektura evroatlanticheskoy bezopasnosti, op. cit.

18   Ibidem, p. 117.

19   See more, Trine Flockhart, Charles A. Kupchan and others (eds.), Liberal Order in a Post Western World, Transatlantic Academy, Washington, dc, May 2014. We need to talk about Europe, European Identity Debates at the Council of Europe 2013–14. Council of Europe, Strasbourg, Sept. 2014.

that meet the current needs. One may make a reference here to the Aspen Ministers Forum and the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI). A new initiative is taken up also by the European Leadership Network (ELN) which has produced the paper on *Greater Europe*.

The idea proposed by ELN has developed the old concept that security has to be based on cooperation. It requires innovative thinking among the managing executive groups of both transatlantic security and defence organisations.[20] The starting point for the effective implementation of the commonstrategy of building sustainable peace and security in Europe should be a common perception and understanding of threats by all countries of the transatlantic community.

The ELN authors[21] recommend in the context of Ukraine's crisis the exerciseof self-restraint and the observance of the following rules:

· Exercise full military and political restraint and take steps to encourage andensure the military and political restraint of all of their relevant allies andpartners in the wider region;

· Embrace increased military-to-military communication, information

· exchange and transparency measures in the interests of all and;

· Engage in direct dialogue with each other as an accompaniment to a dialogue between the parties inside Ukraine and between Ukrainian partiesand other actors outside the country.

The ELN Report of 10th November 2014 contained the following recommendations:

First, that the Russian leadership should urgently re-evaluate the costs and risks of continuing its increasingly assertive military posture, and that the Western diplomacy should be aimed at persuading Russia to move in this direction, in its own as well as everyone else's national security interests.

Second, that all sides should exercise military and political restraint andpolitical leaders should review their military rules of engagement to ensurerestraint at all levels of command, and to reduce any potential for an actual exchange of fire.

Finally, all sides must improve military-to-military communication andtransparency to increase stability and predictability by increasing warning and decision time for leaders. The alternative is to perpetuate a situation in which mistrust, fear and shortened leadership decision times characterize avolatile stand-off between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed alliance.

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20   This concept was discussed in Warsaw (30 May 2014) on the basis of the A Task Force Position Paper on Crisis Management in Europe in the Context of Events in Ukraine.

21   The works were performed by former politicians and intellectuals from the United Kingdom (Des Browne, former minister of defence and Malcolm Rifkind, former minister of defence and foreign affairs), France (Paul Quilès and Hervé Morin—former ministers of defence), Germany (Volker Rühe, former minister of defence), Spain (Ana de Palacio, former minister of foreign affairs), Turkey and a group of former Russian politicians (Igor Ivanov, Vitali Trubnikov, Igor Yurgens, Anatoly Adamishin and others). Both co-chairs of the Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters took part in the works of that team, academician Anatoly V. Torkunov and professor Adam D. Rotfeld.

Polycentric World

Security is subject to change. New powers emerge next to old powers. By their nature, they call into question *the status quo* and seek to obtain a position and influence in the regional and global system, which will allow them to pursue their strategic interests. This natural dynamic of the world system generates international tensions. It inevitably leads to a change of the balance of power.

A new cooperative order which would reflect the complexity and interdependence of the modern world should help advance continuous peaceful transformation, which in practice means that the importance and role of 'old powers' will decrease, while the growing clout of 'emerging powers' will be accepted.

European security in the second decade of the 21st century does not fit the concept of polarity: it is neither an international order ruled by one hegemon (unipolar model), nor an order recognizing the right of global powers to maintain their own 'zones of influence' or 'spheres of privileged interests' (multipolar model). What has been taking shape after the collapse of the bipolar model is a polycentric system where control and power are dispersed. As for the rules and norms which were agreed in the past and adjusted in an adequate way to a world that no longer exists, there is a need to adapt the rules and the code of conduct to suit the new reality and conditions.

Thus defined, a polycentric system assumes the world is heterogeneous rather than homogenous. This, in turn, means that we must draw up and accept, by way of consensus, new rules arising from the political diversity of the international community in the second decade of the 21st century.[22]

One has also to take under consideration a traditional lack of interest of the great powers to rely on multilateral security institutions unless they could be used as instruments in pursuing their strategies. In other words, the great powers as a rule have an inclination to instrumentalize multilateral institutions in their own interests but do not have an interest to serve as instruments for them. In this respect the OSCE experience is not an exceptional one.

Concluding Remarks

The priorities of strategies for co-operation and joint solutions under the OSCE auspices should include in 2015 immediate steps and measures aimed at:

First, prevention of a direct military conflict between the West and Russia; Second, development of political, economic and military conditions for a durable and just peaceful settlement of the crisis in and around Ukraine; Third, strengthening of the OSCE Mission to Ukraine and establishing a multilateral mechanism to monitor and supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreement (Minsk II);

Fourth, elaborating a framework for the lasting political settlement of the Ukraine crisis within the new European security order based on:

- Confirmation of the OSCE Decalogue of principles—sovereignty of States; non-use of force; inviolability of frontiers; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-operation among States; and fulfillment in good faith of obligations

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22   Cf. Charles A. Kupchan, No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, Oxford/New York, 2012, and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Reordering Order: Global Change and the Need for a New Normative Consensus', in Liberal Order in a Post-Western World, op. cit., pp. 3–12.

under international law;

· Elaboration of innovative and adequate to the new risks and threats military and non-military confidence and security-building measures, incl. rejection of some old ideas of zones of influence or privileged interests for great powers as irreconcilable with the principle of sovereignty and equal rights of all the OSCE participating states;

· Revitalization and reactivation of the negotiation on the European conventional arms control process and on new sets of confidence and security building measures (CSBMS) under the OSCE auspices;

· The core and fundamental political component of a new European order has to be both the inviolability of national territories of states and the incontestability of internal political order.[23]

· Adjustment of the existing institutions and organs to the new tasks and challenges ("not everything has to be reinvented, but many things could be rediscovered[24])." Some OSCE mechanisms could be up-graded (i.e. the OSCE Permanent Council composed of heads of missions in Vienna may be transformed and reconstructed as the Euro-Atlantic Security Forum on a higher political level) and the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) mandate might be strengthened within a possible new Center for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management.[25]

The time is ripe to initiate the process of negotiations with an aim to find the common security denominator for the West and Russia in the form of a new security arrangement. Such a negotiated compromise has to reconcile both different threat perceptions and adversary national security interests.

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23   As suggested in the German SWP Report by Markus Kaim, Hanns W. Maull and Kirsten Westphal, 'The Pan-European Order at the Crossroads: Three Principles for a New Beginning', in SWP Comments 18, Berlin, March 2015, p. 5.

24   Ibidem, p. 7.

25   Max van der Stoel, the first CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities was right in his judgement: "The durable prevention (…) requires a long-term perspective. It involves building a viable democracy and its institutions, creating confidence between the government and the population, structuring the protection and promotion of human rights, the elimination of all forms of gender or racial discrimination and respect for minorities". In: The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the CSCE, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1994, p. 53.

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Security and Human Rights (formerly Helsinki Monitor) is a journal devoted to issues inspired by the work and principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It looks at the challenge of building security through cooperation across the northern hemisphere, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, as well as how this experience can be applied to other parts of the world. It aims to stimulate thinking on the question of protecting and promoting human rights in a world faced with serious threats to security.

Netherlands Helsinki Committee
Het Nutshuis
Riviervismarkt 4
2513 AM The Hague
The Netherlands

www.nhc.nl