

Assessing the success of EU-OSCE cooperation: a case of mutualism?

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with a particular focus on the restart in cooperation occurring at the turn of the century. This was due to the rediscovery of the organisations' common past, shared values, similar goals, the drawing of identical security strategies and an increased field presence in the same regions. The EU-OSCE relationship has not been without its shortcomings, but the successes of the cooperation have outnumbered the various hurdles. Furthermore, the relationship can be classified as a case of mutualism, as both partners have benefited therefrom.

Keywords

EU-OSCE cooperation; cooperative security; mutualism

Introduction: the basics of the relationship and cooperation prior to the turn of the century

This paper examines the cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with an emphasis on the developments since the end of the Cold War, and particularly following the turn of the century. The paper starts by introducing the basics of the relationship and its evolution over the years, focusing on the factors which made the restart in cooperation possible at the end of the 1990s. This is followed by a comparison of the two entities' identical security strategies and their field presence in the same regions, before turning to some of the shortcomings of the relationship, and the steps that have been taken by both sides to address them. Finally, the conclusion provides answers to the main research questions, namely, how successful has the cooperation been, and whether the relationship can be classified as a case of mutualism?

The basic elements of the relationship highlight its sheer magnitude and underline its importance, which have often been neglected by both scholars and policy-makers. Its significance is proven by the following facts: all 28 EU Member States are also participating States of the OSCE; contributions from EU Member States account for more than two-thirds of the OSCE budget; and the EU constitutes one of the biggest donors of extrabudgetary contributions for a large number of OSCE projects and programmes. The EU is represented in all OSCE decision-making bodies by the delegation of the country chairing the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU. Cooperation takes place in a multitude of policy areas, such as: judicial and police reform, public administration, anti-corruption measures; democratisation, institution-building and human rights; media development; small and medium-sized enterprise development; border management and combating human trafficking; and election observation.

Their lengthy coexistence is additional evidence of the relationship's importance and a further justification for this study. According to Lynch, the OSCE and its predecessor the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) "have always been testing grounds for EU foreign policy". This dates back to 1970 when the Foreign Ministers of the then European Community (EC) decided to handle the CSCE preparations within the European Political Cooperation format. This continued with the Commission's active involvement in the preparatory negotiations on the Helsinki Final Act and the signature of two other basic OSCE documents, the 1990 *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* and the 1999 *Charter for European Security*, by the then Presidents of the European Commission.

Throughout the 1990s, both the EU and the OSCE were undergoing fundamental institutional changes and parallel to that had to deal with conflicts that were ravaging the European continent. The two invested a

considerable amount of their resources and energy in dealing with the former internal processes, which accounted for their modest involvement in the resolution of conflicts and their limited cooperation. The EC was preoccupied with its leap into a three-pillar EU, while the CSCE was slowly evolving into a fully-fledged organisation. Thus, the wars that erupted in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union throughout the 1990s came as an additional burden, and owing to inexperience and unpreparedness, both the EU and the OSCE were slow to react and reluctant to intervene or cooperate in the settlement of these conflicts. Since then, it has become the norm that their involvement tends to be at its strongest in the aftermath of conflicts.

In the rare instances of cooperation in the 1990s, the EU and OSCE worked together on an *ad hoc* basis. Their cooperation broadened and deepened only after the EU started developing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and particular modalities for cooperation were not discussed until the EU became more actively involved in civilian crisis management. The *Amsterdam Treaty*, which was signed in 1997, but did not enter into force until 1999, recognised for the first time the possibility of the EU having a comprehensive role in the area of crisis management. In the words of the then High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, this was the first firm evidence of the “determination of the European Union to contribute more actively to peace and security in Europe”. Thus, the turn of the century marked a decisive shift towards greater intensification and the formalisation of the EU-OSCE relationship. At the same time cooperation received an additional impetus with the development of the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and later the Eastern Partnership. In the founding documents of these policies cooperation with the OSCE features prominently.

Development of identical security strategies

The first concrete step towards greater cooperation was made by the OSCE at the 1999 Istanbul Summit, when the Heads of State or Government issued the *Charter for European Security*, which contained a *Platform for Co-operative Security*. This call for increased cooperation with other international organisations was reaffirmed in the *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century*, issued at the 2003 Maastricht Ministerial Council. Several days later, the EU responded with the *European Security Strategy*, which contains elements also found in the two OSCE documents. There now follows a closer comparative study of the above documents, as these constitute the basis for closer EU-OSCE cooperation.

The *Charter for European Security*, hereinafter referred to as the *Charter*, issued at the dawn of the new century, started by expressing the “firm commitment to a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area where participating States are at peace with each other, and individuals and communities live in freedom, prosperity and security”. Furthermore, it committed itself to the creation of “a common and indivisible security space ... [and] an OSCE area free of dividing lines”. It then went on to identify the common challenges all OSCE participating States were faced with, among which: international terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime and drug trafficking; acute economic problems and environmental degradation. After reaffirming its commitments to the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the OSCE founding documents, as well as acknowledging the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the innovative *Platform for Co-operative Security*, referred to as the *Platform*, was introduced. Based on the presumption that the “risks and challenges we face today cannot be met by a single State or organization”, the *Platform* called for “even closer co-operation among international organizations”.

The *Platform*, which was adopted as an essential element of the *Charter*, aimed to “further strengthen and develop co-operation with competent organizations on the basis of equality and in a spirit of partnership”.

Its principles were applicable to any organisation or institution whose members would decide to adhere to them and across all dimensions of security. It advocated political and operational coherence among the multitude of bodies dealing with security. While it offered the OSCE as a framework for cooperation, it would do so only when appropriate, and with respect to the particular strengths and comparative advantages of each organisation, i.e. it did not intend to create a “hierarchy of organizations or a permanent division of labour among them”. The Operational Document of the *Platform* suggested that cooperation can be enhanced through the following instruments and mechanisms: regular contacts and meetings; a continuous framework for dialogue; increased transparency and practical co-operation, including the identification of liaison officers or points of contact; and cross-representation at appropriate meetings. As regards the field operations, the modalities for cooperation could include: regular information exchanges and meetings, joint needs assessment missions, the secondment of experts by other organizations to the OSCE, the appointment of liaison officers, the development of common projects and field operations.

The implementation of the *Platform*'s modalities for cooperation has been with mixed success. True, there have been some organisational adjustments within the OSCE, as in 2000, when the Section for External Cooperation was placed under the direct supervision of the Secretary General, thus making it the first point of contact in the OSCE for other international organisations. Further steps in implementing the modalities of EU-OSCE cooperation were taken when the regular meetings of OSCE-EU Ministerial and Ambassadorial Troikas were established in 2002, which were supplemented with annual staff-level meetings a year later. However, there have also been setbacks in the formalisation of the relationship, such as in 2006 when the Austrian EU Presidency and the Belgian Chairmanship of the OSCE worked together on a Joint Declaration intending to “codify the interaction between the two organisations”, but to no avail.

In December 2003, the Ministerial Council adopted the *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century*, referred to as the *OSCE Strategy*. In large part it repeats the provisions of the 1999 *Charter*, including those on cooperation with the international community. In the opening lines, it reaffirmed its “multidimensional concept of common, comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security” and its commitment to a “free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area without dividing lines”. In a similar fashion to the *Charter*, it expressed its respect for international law and the UN Charter, and recognised the Security Council's overarching authority over the maintenance of international peace and security. Then the *OSCE Strategy* goes on to list the already familiar threats of the new century: inter and intra-State conflicts; terrorism; organized crime; discrimination and intolerance; economic problems and environmental degradation. The response of the OSCE to these threats was to be multidimensional and not to occur in a vacuum, but through a framework for cooperation, in a “co-ordinated and complementary way, which avoids duplication and maintains focus”. Thus, maintaining the validity of the 1999 *Charter* and *Platform*. Next, the *Strategy* examines each of the threats and the respective measures needed to address them. Last, but not least, it turns to cooperation with international organisations, reviving the spirit of the 1999 *Platform*. As no single state or organisation could meet today's challenges, there was a need to intensify “interaction at both the political and the working levels . . . , both at headquarters and in the field”. This would require contacts between envoys and special representatives, the development of shared strategies and joint fact-finding.

A mere ten days after the conclusion of the Maastricht Ministerial Council, at the meeting of the European Council in Brussels, the EU adopted its *European Security Strategy (ESS)*, which had been drafted by the then High Representative Solana, and provided the conceptual framework for the Union's CFSP. In its opening lines, the *ESS*, completely in line with the 1999 and 2003 OSCE documents, reaffirmed that “no single country

is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own". The key threats identified by it constitute a list which is identical to that compiled earlier by the OSCE: terrorism; the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; regional conflicts; state failure; and organised crime. In the next section dealing with the first of the EU's strategic objectives, the *ESS* admitted that "none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means", and addressing these threats required a mixture of instruments. This fully embraces the OSCE's concept of common, comprehensive and indivisible security. Further resemblances are to be found in the next strategic objective, namely building security in the neighbourhood. Here, the *ESS* advocated the following: promoting a "ring of well governed countries" on the borders of the EU; ensuring that enlargement would not create "new dividing lines in Europe"; and sharing the "benefits of economic and political cooperation" with the neighbours. This is reminiscent of the call for a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area without dividing lines, founded on the very first pages of both the 1999 *Charter* and the 2003 *OSCE Strategy*.

The third and last strategic objective identified by the *ESS* is "international order based on effective multilateralism", and it is here that the similarities with the two OSCE documents are most abundant. It declared that in our highly globalised world, security and prosperity are becoming dependent on an effective multilateral system, which is in turn dependent on the "development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order". Similar to the OSCE documents, the *ESS* also: pledged its allegiance to "upholding and developing International Law"; recognised the UN Charter as the "fundamental framework for international relations"; and reaffirmed the Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Next, the *ESS* highlighted the important role of regional organisations for strengthening global governance, and in particular commended the vital contributions of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Last, but not least, the *ESS* offered the following recipe for a stronger international order, interspersed with ingredients from all three security dimensions of the OSCE: "spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights". The appendix provides a more graphical representation of the strategies' comparison.

Further factors favouring a restart in the relationship

The personal efforts of high-level officials also played an important role in the restart of the relationship. One such example is the intervention by Christopher Patten, which constituted the first time that a Member of the European Commission had addressed the Permanent Council of the OSCE. The then EU Commissioner for External Relations opened his speech by declaring that both the EU and the OSCE are "servants in the same cause – that of a secure, democratic, peaceful and prosperous Europe". He continued by stating that both organisations aimed to "promote the rule of law, to build solid and effective institutions, to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms and to entrench democracy". Patten admitted the EU's failure to prevent violence in the Balkans, but assessed its involvement in the aftermath as much more successful, especially when it came to crisis management and basic reconstruction. He expressed optimism regarding the next stage of the EU's commitment to the region, namely that of "building sustainable democratic institutions and, above all, establishing the rule of law", which he believed would be fertile ground for closer cooperation with the OSCE. He praised the OSCE's involvement in the region, which according to him helped to "underpin the EU's Stabilisation and Association Process".

In particular, Patten commended the work of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media for their efforts

in improving, respectively, the election processes, the situation of national and Roma minorities, and the freedom of the press. The Commissioner called for greater EU-OSCE cooperation in solving the frozen conflicts of Transnistria and the South Caucasus, and identified Central Asia as a region where joint efforts should be furthered. He clearly endorsed the OSCE's concept of security by implying that EU-OSCE cooperation should encompass all three dimensions of security, with particular emphasis on conflict prevention and crisis management, economic and environmental aspects, and the human dimension.

Another prominent boost to EU-OSCE cooperation was given with the two speeches by the then High Representative Solana to the Permanent Council of the OSCE. Through both of these addresses, Solana inspired new life into the relationship by touching upon the common past, shared values, similar goals, and the increasing involvement of both organisations in the same regions. The first speech started by stating that the EU-OSCE cooperation was becoming a "permanent feature of the new security order emerging in Europe after the end of the Cold War". The need for closer cooperation in tackling the challenges and threats of the new century was justified by the already familiar diagnosis that "no single state, institution or organisation is able to meet these challenges and risks on its own". Then, Solana described the range of areas and issues on which the EU-OSCE cooperation flourished, with particular focus on civilian crisis management and Kosovo.

The second speech was much more comprehensive in both its scope and contents. It not only looked towards the long-term prospects, but also delved deeper into history in order to retrace the origins of the relationship. According to Solana, both the EC and the CSCE were "born out of the Cold War, with a similar desire to establish forms of cooperation in Europe which would defuse the tensions between former enemies and prevent further conflict on the continent". For him, both pursued the same goals, but through different means, with the EC "designed to make war impossible again in Europe, by integrating the economies of the Member States and by developing supranational institutions", while the CSCE strove "to reduce tensions between the West and the Soviet bloc by facilitating dialogue and mutual contacts". This cemented the notion of "natural-born partners" with a common past and inevitably a common future. After this brief historical introduction, Solana pledged the EU's allegiance to the principles of the 1999 Charter, and its "commitment to strengthen cooperation between international organisations and institutions". Next, Solana recognised the "shared commitment of the EU and the OSCE to democracy, prosperity and stability in Europe as a whole, and beyond". He insisted that pragmatism was the partners' starting point, thereby advocating: a greater exchange of information and expertise; cooperation on the ground and between headquarters; the development of compatible methods and standards. He envisaged a bright future for the relationship, one characterised by coordination, complementarity and concertation.

The Council of the EU also demonstrated a willingness to contribute to the partnership's restart. In its November 2003 draft conclusions, it called for greater EU-OSCE cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. It recognised the shared principles and values of the two entities, above all the promotion of democracy, human rights and institution-building. Cooperation was to be guided by the principle of complementarity, avoiding duplication, taking into account the respective comparative advantages of each organisation, and ensuring the added value of the relationship. The conclusions also established modalities for regular contacts and meetings at the political, field and staff-to-staff levels. A year later, the Council produced a draft report with a two-fold aim: to strengthen the EU-OSCE relationship; and to reinforce the performance of the EU within the OSCE. The EU committed itself to continue to "promote security and stability in the OSCE area based on the core principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights".

States holding the rotating chairmanships of the OSCE or the Council of the EU also made vital contributions towards the restart of the relationship. Having the opportunity to set the agenda, for a year or half a year respectively, certain states have used their position as both participating States of the OSCE and Member States of the EU to further the cooperation between the two organisations. Enhancing cooperation with other international organisations was declared as one of the priorities of the 2003 Dutch Chairmanship of the OSCE. At the end of the year, it was concluded that the Chairmanship had been fairly successful in this respect, particularly as regards the strengthening of OSCE-EU relations. In a similar fashion, the 2008 Finnish Chairmanship of the OSCE highlighted greater cooperation with other international organisations as one of its priorities. This was most clearly exemplified when dealing with the war between Russia and Georgia. Immediately after the outbreak of the conflict, the Finnish Chairmanship cooperated closely with the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council, which contributed to the achievement of a timely ceasefire. However, the joint efforts did not end there, but were brought successfully to the next stage of the resolution of the conflict, namely its political settlement sought within the Geneva discussions. As Taalas and Mottola argue, "throughout the crisis, stress was laid on ... the OSCE's close cooperation with the EU, and particularly with the very active French EU Presidency".

Cooperation on the ground and joint field activities

The joint field presence of the EU and the OSCE is most visible in the following regions: South-Eastern Europe/Western Balkans; Eastern Europe; South Caucasus; and Central Asia. Each of the regions will be examined in turn, starting with the Balkans, as this is where both the EU and the OSCE have their longest-lasting and largest involvement, with the focus being on Kosovo and Macedonia. As mentioned in the introduction, both entities were reluctant to intervene in the immediate outbreak of the wars of Yugoslav disintegration, or when they did it was in a limited manner. Their strength was demonstrated in their contributions to post-conflict rehabilitation, especially following the end of the Kosovo War, when the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (SPSEE) was initiated by the EU, and later put under the auspices of the OSCE. It was the "first comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the international community, aimed at strengthening the efforts of the countries" towards peace, democracy, respect for human rights, economic prosperity, regional co-operation and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. A similar formula, initiated by the EU and supervised by the OSCE, had been applied earlier in the Stability Pact for Europe. However, it was a relatively shortlived project, so the SPSEE can be considered as the first successful and lasting EU-OSCE cooperation on the ground.

Both the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) and the EU's Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo (EULEX) constitute the two organisations' largest field missions. The OMIK represents the third involvement of the OSCE in Kosovo and, along with EULEX, they fall under the authority of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In the fourpillar structure established by the international community, responsibilities were divided as follows: the UN took care of Pillars I (Police and Justice) and II (Civil administration); the OSCE was in charge of Pillar III (Democratisation and Institution-building); while the EU was responsible for Pillar IV (Reconstruction and Economic development). However, the boundaries between the pillars have eroded and the EU has taken on new responsibilities, with EULEX focusing exclusively on three rule of law sectors – police, customs and the judiciary. This has not resulted in any major duplication of activities, as OMIK retains a much broader mandate, and the cooperation between OMIK and EULEX has been in relatively good shape. Most recently, this was exemplified in the municipal elections of 2013, when the OMIK was in charge of facilitating the elections in the four northern Kosovo municipalities, in cooperation with the Kosovo Police, KFOR and EULEX.

Macedonia has been another venue of successful EU-OSCE cooperation in the Balkans. In fact, the Mission to Skopje constitutes the longest-serving field mission of the OSCE, while the EU had been similarly active, having deployed two civilian (EUPOL Proxima and EUPAT) and one military (EUFOR Concordia) missions. The cooperation has intensified particularly following the 2001 insurgency and the conclusion of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which had been brokered by the EU. In order to be in a better position to assist with the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement, the size and the mandate of the original OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje was expanded. Cooperation has been on a sound footing, especially at the level of the Group of Principals meeting, chaired by the EU Special Representative and involving the OSCE Head of Mission. Overall, the general trend in the Balkans is for the greater involvement of the EU, especially as all the countries have the status of either candidates, or potential candidates, and are deeply involved in the SAP. Nevertheless, the OSCE presence remains of crucial importance, so cooperation is desirable if peace, democracy, market economy and ultimately European integration are to be guaranteed for the future.

Turning to the other regions identified earlier, cooperation in the theatres of frozen conflicts is of particular interest. These conflicts had for a long time remained the prerogative of the OSCE, with the EU lending more of its support in recent years in the search for viable resolutions to them. For most of its duration, the Transnistrian conflict had been dealt with in the 5-sided format. It has only been since 2005 that it was upgraded to the 5+2 format to include the EU and the USA as external observers, with the OSCE actively supporting their inclusion. Ever since the EU's participation, cooperation between the OSCE Mission to Moldova and its EU counterparts has increased. The EU's more active involvement in the two protracted conflicts in Georgia followed only after the 2008 war. Ironically, at the end of the same year the OSCE failed to extend the mandate of its Mission to Georgia. Nevertheless, the EU-OSCE cooperation has remained vital, as both partners, along with the UN, are co-chairs of the Geneva talks. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is characterised by even less EU-OSCE cooperation, and it remains largely the prerogative of the latter partner, negotiations being carried out within the Minsk Group. Central Asia is the region where EU-OSCE cooperation has been most underdeveloped, but at the same time it holds a great potential to grow. This has been the case especially since 2007, when the EU expressed its firm interest in the region with the adoption of its Central Asian Strategy.

Shortcomings of the relationship

The EU-OSCE cooperation has not been without its shortcomings and there have been certain criticisms hurled at the relationship. On the one hand, the development of conflict-prevention and crisis-management policies by the EU has led to accusations that it has breached the OSCE's area of jurisdiction, which has resulted in a geographical and functional overlap. While this statement is exaggerated, it is not untrue. This is proven by the efforts on both sides to ensure complementarity and compatibility, while reducing any duplication of their respective activities. There has also been the argument that accession to the EU tends to result in the termination of OSCE Missions, as has been the case in Estonia, Latvia and Croatia. It has been suggested that since the host states often feel stigmatised by the continued presence of the OSCE and even view it as a potential brake on their EU membership, the sudden withdrawal of the OSCE can result in unfinished business. However, this issue has been partly redressed by the Copenhagen criteria which candidate countries have to satisfy before they can become members of the EU. According to them, the countries wishing to join need to have stable institutions "guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities".

Furthermore, during the accession negotiations, the candidate countries have to adopt the *acquis* in full without any opt-outs. This process is clearly asymmetric, with the EU unilaterally imposing the rules and

closely monitoring the process by regular reports. At times when insufficient progress had been made by the candidate countries, it had postponed their membership perspective to ensure compliance with its norms. This had been the case with the enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, when the EU opened accession negotiations with five of the candidate countries in 1997, while the five “laggards” had to wait until 1999. In the case of the Western Balkans, additional conditions for membership were set out in the SAP, relating to regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations. In the case of Croatia, the opening of accession negotiations was made conditional upon full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Thus, through its stringent membership criteria, rigorous approximation process, and regular scrutiny, the EU ensures that its founding values and principles, shared also by the OSCE, are not compromised.

Another shortcoming held responsible for hampering the relationship is the OSCE’s lack of legal personality. In its 2010 resolution, dedicated to strengthening the OSCE, the European Parliament called for a joint EU-OSCE effort to “continue the dialogue on the legal framework of the OSCE and to reiterate the need for a prompt adoption of the draft Convention on international legal personality, legal capacity and privileges and immunities”. While such a move would not compromise existing OSCE commitments, it would strengthen the Organization’s “identity and profile, also solving a number of practical problems for its personnel, especially when employed in crisis areas”. Further criticism has been aimed at the loose organisational structure of the OSCE. Wohlfeld and Pietrusiewicz have argued that the OSCE should strengthen its representation at headquarters level as it lacks a permanent liaison structure with the EU. In a similar fashion to the EU’s Delegation to the International Organisations in Vienna, the OSCE can establish an office in Brussels, which can also accommodate other international organisations having their headquarters there with which it maintains close relations (e.g. NATO). Both entities are working towards addressing the problem of competition for human resources.

Conclusion: a case of mutualism?

The relationship between the EU and the OSCE has developed rapidly since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since the turn of the century, when several factors made this favourable. These were, above all, the EU’s gradual development of CFSP, its increased involvement in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, and its launch of the SAP and ENP. In this way, the EU intervened in policy areas and regions that were long considered as the traditional domain of the OSCE. This inevitably led to some duplication of activities, a geographical and functional overlap, and even to an unjustified fear, on the side of the OSCE, of its diminishing role in the future. However, these turf wars were kept to a minimum and the focus was quickly shifted to greater cooperation, complementarity and concertation between the two entities. In the process, both had to bow to certain demands from the other side, but without compromising their founding values and principles. Examples are the closing down of OSCE missions in the states aspiring to EU membership or the EU’s gradual adoption of the OSCE’s comprehensive and multidimensional approach to security. These examples show the ability of both actors to learn from each other. Such was the most logical outcome because of their common past, shared values, and similar goals. After all, EU and OSCE membership are not mutually exclusive.

The intention of pursuing cooperation rather than confrontation was clearly expressed by both sides early on. The overlap between the 1999 *Charter for European Security*/2003 *OSCE Strategy* and the 2003 *European Security Strategy* of the EU was a reassuring signal. In a similar vein, certain high-ranking officials and chairing states took it as their cause to facilitate the dialogue further. Once the example had been set at the highest


political level, it was replicated at the lower levels. The most recent illustration was the resolution of the European Parliament which did not call for the weakening, but rather the strengthening of the OSCE, and the leading role of the EU in that process. As regards the cooperation on the ground, there have been more successful cases like Kosovo and Macedonia, and less successful ones, mainly concerning the frozen conflicts. The general trend is that the EU has been gaining more and more ground in the Balkans, but not without the OSCE's consent. In Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus, and in particular in the theatres of frozen conflicts, the OSCE retains the upper hand, but with increasing contributions from the EU. Central Asia remains the region where the prospect of cooperation is yet to be unveiled to its full extent.

In conclusion, to paraphrase Solana, the EU-OSCE relationship is not only one between natural-born partners, but also one from which both participants benefit, thus allowing one to draw an analogy with the concept of mutualism. On the one hand, the OSCE still has a lot to teach the EU. In many cases the OSCE has been the pioneer, both as concerns the development of expertise in certain policy areas, as well as its involvement in particular regions, which in turn has given the OSCE a new role and *raison d'être*. On the other hand, the EU with its greater resources and capacity stands a good chance of fulfilling its commitment to strengthen the OSCE, and through this to enhance its influence as a global player. But above all, it is us, the citizens of a more secure Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian community, who are increasingly benefiting from this cooperation.



Appendix: Comparative table of the security strategies of the EU and the OSCE

	1999 Charter for European Security	2003 OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century	2003 European Security Strategy
Key threats to security:	International terrorism; Violent extremism; Organised crime and drug trafficking; Economic problems and environmental degradation	Inter and intra-state conflicts; Terrorism; Organised crime; Discrimination and intolerance; Economic problems and economic degradation	Terrorism; Proliferation of WMD; Regional conflicts; State failure; Organised crime, trafficking in drugs, women, weapons
Justification for cooperation:	No one state or organisation can face risks and challenges of today	No single state or organisation can on its own meet challenges facing us today	No single country able to tackle today's complex problems on its own
Principles for cooperation:	On basis of equality, not intending to create hierarchy of organisations or division of labour	Coordination, complementarity, avoiding duplication, maintaining focus	International order based on effective multilateralism
Adherence to and respect for:	UN Charter; Security Council's primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security	International law; UN Charter; Security Council's primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security	International law; UN Charter; Security Council's primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security
Approach to security:	Common, comprehensive and indivisible security	Common, comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security	None of new threats to security is purely military nor can be tackled by purely military means, requires mixture of instruments
Ultimate goals:	Free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area free of dividing lines and zones with different levels of security	Free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area without dividing lines	World of well-governed countries; no new dividing lines in Europe; extend benefits of economic and political cooperation to neighbours
Fundamental values:	Democracy, rule of law and human rights	Human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and rule of law	Rule of law, democracy, good governance, human rights



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Security and Human Rights (formerly Helsinki Monitor) is a journal devoted to issues inspired by the work and principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It looks at the challenge of building security through cooperation across the northern hemisphere, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, as well as how this experience can be applied to other parts of the world. It aims to stimulate thinking on the question of protecting and promoting human rights in a world faced with serious threats to security.

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